

Reacting to Conflict: Civilian Capabilities in the EU, UN and OSCE

Citation for published version (APA):

Dijkstra, H., Petrov, P., & Mahr, E. (2016). *Reacting to Conflict: Civilian Capabilities in the EU, UN and OSCE*. EU-CIVCAP Project. <https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.26312.32007>

Document status and date:

Published: 02/11/2016

DOI:

[10.13140/RG.2.2.26312.32007](https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.26312.32007)

Document Version:

Publisher's PDF, also known as Version of record

Please check the document version of this publication:

- A submitted manuscript is the version of the article upon submission and before peer-review. There can be important differences between the submitted version and the official published version of record. People interested in the research are advised to contact the author for the final version of the publication, or visit the DOI to the publisher's website.
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- The final published version features the final layout of the paper including the volume, issue and page numbers.

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EU-CIVCAP

Preventing and Responding to Conflict: Developing EU
CIVilian CAPabilities for a sustainable peace

**Reacting to Conflict:
Civilian Capabilities in the EU, UN and OSCE**
Deliverable 4.1

(Version 1.3; 2 November 2016)

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Maastricht University



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 653227.

How to cite this report

Hylke Dijkstra, Petar Petrov, and Ewa Mahr (2016), “Reacting to Conflict: Civilian Capabilities in the EU, UN and OSCE,” *EU-CIVCAP Report*, DL4.1, available from: http://www.eu-civcap.net/files/2016/11/Reacting_Conflict-Civilian_Capabilities_EU_UN_OSCE.pdf.

Summary of the Document

| | |
|-----------------------------------|--|
| Title | DL 4.1 Reacting to Conflict: Civilian Capabilities in the EU, UN and OSCE |
| Last modification | 2 November 2016 |
| State | Final |
| Version | 1.3 |
| Leading Partner | Maastricht University (UM) |
| Other Participant Partners | N/A |
| Authors | Hylke Dijkstra, Petar Petrov and Ewa Mahr |
| Audience | Public |
| Abstract | This report analyses how the EU, UN and OSCE make resources available for civilian missions. It starts with an overview of civilian missions around the world before comparing civilian planning and conduct procedures in these international organisations. The report zooms in on EU civilian capabilities and provides policy recommendations. |
| Keywords | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Civilian capabilities • EU • UN • OSCE • Planning • Resources |

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

International organisations increasingly send civilians on crisis operations. Whether they are police deployed as an integrated unit, rule of law experts mentoring local officials, or monitors looking after the implementation of a peace agreement, the purpose of these operations is to improve security. The EU, UN and the OSCE are the most prominent providers of civilian missions. When these organisations establish such civilian missions, they need to resource them. Civilian missions need to be planned and financed. Mission staff needs to be recruited and trained. And civilian missions require equipment and mission support. This report analyses the question ***“How, and through which mechanisms, do the EU, UN and OSCE make resources available for civilian missions?”***

The report starts with a stocktaking exercise of civilian missions around the world. Any discussion about civilian capabilities needs to be preceded by an understanding of the purpose and objective of civilian missions. Yet, in fact, we know very little about the scale and scope of these missions as they have developed in the last decade. The report discusses the historical development of the EU, UN and the OSCE in terms of civilian missions. It also provides a classification of the type of civilian missions addressed in this report. Subsequently, it analyses trends in civilian missions since 2003. It examines civilian deployments across regions. It furthermore studies the mandates of the different civilian missions, demonstrating that mandates tend to be focused on specific areas rather than to be comprehensive. The first section of the report therefore provides a basis for the in-depth study of civilian capabilities in the remainder of the report.

The report continues, in the second section, by outlining the mechanisms for civilian mission planning and capability resourcing in the EU, UN and OSCE. It provides first a short overview of the planning procedures in each of these three organisations. It focuses on the finance, staff, equipment and mission support. The comparative perspective allows the report to identify best practices and shortfalls in terms of planning and resourcing. The report finds that all three organisations have tried to incrementally improve their civilian capabilities to meet the challenge of rapid response to conflict. Contrary to what is sometimes implied in the literature, some of these improvements have been significant. That having been said, weaknesses nonetheless remain in several areas and all three organisations could benefit from the experience of other international organisations.

In the third section, the report zooms in on the EU. Based on the experience with missions so far and using insights from the comparative analysis, this section discusses in depth the financing, staff, and equipment and mission support of the EU. It finds significant improvements in terms of financing and the procurement of equipment. The EU has also strengthened the training for civilian staff. Challenges remain, however, with the availability of staff, the training and duty of care for the contracted staff categories, and mission support from Brussels. It is important that the EU addresses these challenges, particularly to improve rapid response. While ‘political will’ is sometimes mentioned as an obstacle for progress, it is worth noting that the UN and OSCE have been more successful in these areas.

The report concludes with an overview of the findings and policy recommendations to improve the practice of EU civilian capabilities in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Policy Recommendation 1 (Funding)

The EU needs to reallocate funding from the operational CFSP budget to the administrative budget of the EEAS to strengthen the enabling mission support services in Brussels.

Policy Recommendation 2 (Member states)

Member states need to do more to ensure that well-trained staff can be selected and recruited for civilian missions at short notice. This requires more intensive coordination between the relevant ministries within each member state.

Policy Recommendation 3 (Pre-deployment training)

The EU needs to make pre-deployment training sustainable, so that every mission member can benefit from training. This includes increasing the training budget of the ESDC as well as making budget once again available for flexible projects.

Policy Recommendation 4 (Training for contracted staff)

The EU needs to provide pre-deployment training as well as relevant specialist training to contracted staff. All missions should have a specific budget allocated to pay for such training.

Policy Recommendation 5 (Virtual standing capacities)

The EU needs to work towards virtual standing capacities that can be used to rapidly launch missions and provide specialist support.

Policy Recommendation 6 (Mission Support Platform)

The new Mission Support Platform needs to be established as quickly as possible. And its capacity should be significantly strengthened.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|--------|--|
| ACNF | Advisory Committee on Management and Finance |
| BLA | Board and Lodging Allowance |
| CfC | Call for Contributions |
| CFSP | Common Foreign and Security Policy |
| CiO | Chairman-in-Office |
| CMC | Crisis Management Concept |
| CMPD | Crisis Management Planning Directorate |
| CONOPS | Concept of Operations |
| CPA | Comprehensive Peace Agreement |
| CPC | Conflict Prevention Centre |
| CPCC | Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability |
| CSOs | Civilian Strategic Options |
| CSDP | Common Security and Defence Policy |
| DDR | Disarmament Demobilization and Reintegration |
| DFS | Department of Field Support |
| DPA | Department of Political Affairs |
| DPKO | Department of Peacekeeping Operations |
| ESDC | European Security and Defence College |
| EU | European Union |
| EULEX | EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo |
| EUMS | EU Military Staff |
| EUPM | EU Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| EUSRs | EU Special Representatives |
| FHQ | Force Headquarters |
| FPI | European Commission's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments |
| FPU | Formed Police Units |
| FTE | full time equivalent |
| FYROM | Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia |
| HEAT | Hostile Environment Awareness Training |
| IMTCs | Integrated Mission Training Centres |
| IPUs | Integrated Police Units |
| IRMA | Integrated Resource Management System |
| ISF | Integrated Strategic Framework |
| ITF | Integrated Task Force |
| ITS | Integrated Training Service |
| JCSC | Justice and Correction Standing Capacity |
| MMA | Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising |
| MSOs | Military Strategic Options |
| NATO | North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
| OFCR | Operational Framework for Crisis Response |
| ODIHR | Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights |
| OHQ | Operations Headquarters |
| OMiK | OSCE mission in Kosovo |
| OPLAN | Operations Plan |
| OSCE | Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe |
| PFCA | Political Framework for Crisis Approach |
| pMS | Participating member states |
| PSC | Political and Security Committee |
| SMM | Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine |
| SPC | Standing Police Capacity |
| SRSG | Special Representative of the Secretary-General |
| SSR | Security Sector Reform |

| | |
|----------|--|
| TAM | Technical Assessment Mission |
| TCCs | Troop Contributing Countries |
| UB | Unified Budget |
| UN | United Nations |
| UNGSC | UN Global Service Centre |
| UNLB | UN Logistical Base |
| UNMIBH | UN Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina |
| UNMIS | UN Mission in Sudan |
| UNMISS | UN Mission in South Sudan |
| UNMIT | United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste |
| UNPROFOR | UN Protection Force in former Yugoslavia |
| UNSC | UN Security Council |
| UNTAC | UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia |

1. INTRODUCTION

International organisations increasingly send civilians on crisis operations. Whether they are police deployed as an integrated unit, rule of law experts mentoring local officials, or monitors looking after the implementation of a peace agreement, the purpose of these operations is to improve security. It is now widely understood that many tasks can be better carried out by civilian missions than by military operations. While the military can contribute to stability and the protection of civilians in conflict regions, they are ill-equipped to provide security within refugee camps or support host countries in building up resilient and professional police forces. Military operations are also rarely transformative insofar as they bring conflicts to a close or prevent future conflicts.

The European Union (EU), United Nations (UN) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) are some of the most prominent providers of civilian conflict prevention and peacebuilding missions. The EU currently has eleven civilian missions under the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). These include a large rule of law mission in Kosovo. Meanwhile, the European Commission oversees countless capacity-building projects in related policy areas. Many of the sixteen UN peacekeeping operations include significant civilian components. A prominent example is the Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The UN has also eight political and peacebuilding missions. Some are small, but they also include the large operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The OSCE has eighteen civilian missions, of which the mission in Ukraine is the most prominent.

When the member states of the EU, UN and OSCE act through these international organisations to establish civilian operations to achieve certain objectives, they need to resource them. Civilian missions need to be planned and financed. Civilian experts need to be recruited and trained. The missions need equipment, such as ICT systems, vehicles, laptops and access to intelligence, but also a secure headquarters, office space, accommodation, logistics, and medical facilities. All these things combined – finance, staff and equipment – are the civilian capabilities required for civilian missions to achieve pre-defined objectives.¹

This report analyses the question: ***“How, and through which mechanisms, do the EU, UN and OSCE make resources available for civilian missions?”*** The focus is therefore primarily on the procedures in the headquarters in Brussels, New York and Vienna and less so on the availability of civilian resources across the member states.² The report is part of the EU-CIVCAP research project, which analyses the civilian capabilities of the EU in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. As such, this report places emphasis on the EU, but the perspective is nonetheless comparative. By analysing mechanisms and procedures of the EU, UN and OSCE, the report seeks to understand the particularities of the EU. The comparative perspective helps us to identify lessons from the other two organisations to the benefit of the EU.

A better understanding of the mechanisms required to make civilian capabilities available is critical to rapid deployment. The report seeks, in this respect, to partly address the

¹ It is important to make a distinction between latent resources (for example, finance, staff or material) and capabilities. Resources are static and civilian capabilities are dynamic. Capabilities are about how resources can be made available for actual missions in support of certain policy objectives. EU-CIVCAP, *EU Capabilities for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding: A Capabilities-Based Assessment* (2016), internal document.

² The capabilities of selected member states are addressed in EU-CIVCAP, *Report on capability-based analysis of technologies, personnel and procedures*, DL2.1 (forthcoming).

challenge of early response in civilian EU crisis management.³ This challenge consists of two elements. First, it is about advance planning, early warning of conflict, and how early warning feeds into the planning and decision-making process.⁴ Second, it is about the ability of the EU and other international organisations to react quickly and appropriately to information and intelligence resulting from these early warning systems.

The report finds that the EU has made notable efforts in improving its civilian capabilities to react to crises and to engage in crisis management. In doing so, it has focused (understandably) on the ‘low-hanging fruit’. For the EU to engage more effectively in civilian CSDP, however, it needs to target some of the more complicated challenges. The EU and its civilian missions frequently run into the ‘political unwillingness’ of some of the member states to spend resources. More often, however, it seems that the high degree of centralisation, institutionalisation and legalisation in the EU creates a lack of flexibility. Indeed, the UN and OSCE also have to deal with a ‘complicated’ membership, but in various cases they have delivered more effectively than the EU.

Key findings of the report include:

- During the first decade of civilian CSDP, the task of locating sufficient **financial resources** was almost always a problem. These days, however, the CFSP budget is sizeable and it is also sufficiently flexible in how it can be allocated across missions. In particular, the annual €37 million allocated for ‘emergency measures’ is very useful. The problem is that procurement remains stringent and moreover that too few mission staff are capable of navigating the web of complicated EU financial procedures. It is also very problematic that insufficient mission funding can be spent in Brussels on issues such as training and mission support. A significant reallocation of the budget from the missions to the EEAS support structures would be appropriate.
- In terms of **mission staff**, the EU has significantly improved its recruitment procedures and has worked on improving pre-deployment training for seconded staff. Two fundamental problems, however, remain. First, since the member states are in charge of selecting and training their outbound seconded staff, and as competences at the national level are widely spread over various ministries (with different priorities), it is difficult to fill vacancies with qualified personnel. Second, no one takes adequate responsibility for internationally contracted staff. Unlike those working for the UN and OSCE, EU contracted staff often receive no pre-deployment training, besides which there are other duty of care issues. This is problematic, as the mission administration normally consists of contracted staff, who have to deal with EU administrative procedures.
- The EU has made some efforts to improve its mission **equipment and mission support**. To set up new missions, the EU now relies on a warehouse in Germany. It

³ The warning-response gap is extensively discussed in the academic literature, in particular with respect to the capabilities of the international community to launch rapid action to prevent genocide. See: A. George and J. Holl, *The Warning-Response Problem and Missed Opportunities in Preventive Diplomacy: A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict* (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1997); C. Meyer, F. Otto, J. Brante and C. De Franco, ‘Recasting the Warning-Response Problem: Persuasion and Preventive Policy’, *International Studies Review* 12:4 (2010), pp. 556-78; H. Hardt, *Time to React: The Efficiency of International Organizations in Crisis Response* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); H. Wulf and T. Debiel, ‘Systemic Disconnects: Why Regional Organizations Fail to Use Early Warning and Response Mechanisms’, *Global Governance*, 16:4 (2010), pp. 525-47.

⁴ EU-CIVCAP, *Report on technological shortcomings in early warning and conflict analysis*, DL3.1 (forthcoming); EU-CIVCAP, *Report on the EU’s capacities for conflict prevention*, DL3.2 (forthcoming).

has also established a range of framework contracts. The individual missions, however, each have primary responsibility for procurement. This has resulted in a situation whereby different ICT systems are used across different missions. The EU has agreed to set up a mission support platform in Brussels, paid for by the missions. When operational, however, it will be a small unit, particularly compared to the New York-based UN Department of Field Support and the UN Global and Regional Service Centres.

This report starts with a stocktaking exercise of civilian missions around the world. Any discussion about civilian capabilities needs to be preceded by an understanding of the purpose and objective of civilian missions.⁵ Yet, in fact, we know very little about the scale and scope of these missions as they have developed over the last decade.⁶ The report continues by outlining the mechanisms for civilian mission planning and capability resourcing in the EU, UN and OSCE. Following a short overview of the planning process, this section of the report focuses on finance, staff, equipment and mission support for each of the three international organisations.⁷ The report subsequently zooms in on the EU and discusses the current state-of-the-art of concepts and planning, finance, staff, equipment and mission support. It concludes with policy recommendations to improve the practice of EU civilian capabilities. The report is based on official documents, open sources, in-depth interviews with key policy makers, and secondary literature.

⁵ EU-CIVCAP, *EU Capabilities for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding* (2016).

⁶ A notable exception are the annual reports (2010-2013) on political missions by the NYU's Center for International Cooperation, which provide comparative data. In addition, there are many publications on each of the individual international organisations.

⁷ The US Department of Defense refers to DOTMLPF (Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership, Personnel and Facilities) in terms of capabilities. See EU-CIVCAP, *EU Capabilities for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding* (2016). While this report discusses the planning process and structure, it pays less attention to organisational capabilities, such as doctrine, organisation and leadership. Furthermore, the study of financial capabilities is critical in international organisations, as one encounters important questions of burden-sharing at the multilateral level (ibid.).

2. CIVILIAN MISSIONS AROUND THE WORLD

This report starts by providing a basic overview of what the EU, UN and OSCE are actually doing in terms of civilian missions. For a capabilities-based assessment, it is important to first understand the objectives, scale and scope of civilian missions before it is possible to analyse the required civilian capabilities and the shortfalls.⁸ This section begins with a discussion of the historical development of each of the three organisations in terms of civilian missions. It also provides a classification of the type of civilian missions addressed in this report. Subsequently, this section analyses trends in civilian missions since 2003. It also examines civilian deployments across regions. Finally, this section analyses the mandates of the different civilian missions. It thus provides a basis for the in-depth study of civilian capabilities in the remainder of the report.

2.1. THE DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILIAN MISSIONS IN THE EU, UN AND OSCE

The starting point is that civilian missions are a post-Cold War phenomenon. While the UN sent police officers to Congo as part of the peacekeeping operation there as early as 1960, deployments were limited during the Cold War period.⁹ There were, for example, only 44 civilian police officers involved in UN missions in 1990 compared to 13,560 civilian police officers in 2016.¹⁰ The UN gained serious expertise in terms of civilian missions with the establishment of UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) and, to a lesser extent, the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia in 1992.¹¹ In 1995, the UN established the first police-only mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH). The next big step came with the establishment of two transitional administration missions in Kosovo and East Timor in 1999. The importance of the civilian components in peacekeeping operations further developed during the 2000s. Currently, almost all new UN operations are multidimensional deployments with a considerable civilian component.

In addition to the civilian components of UN peacekeeping operations, the UN has also established a range of political and peacebuilding missions. While all are fully civilian in nature, this is a fairly wide category of missions. Three origins can be identified. First, the UN Secretary-General has a formal mandate for the peaceful settlement of disputes.¹² This has resulted in the appointment of numerous special envoys, as well as mediation and 'good office' activities, including missions.¹³ Second, following the *An Agenda for Peace* report, the UN placed strong emphasis on conflict prevention, which included peacebuilding.¹⁴ This has triggered the deployment of UN peacebuilding missions since the

⁸ EU-CIVCAP, *EU Capabilities for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding* (2016).

⁹ See further A. Hansen, 'From Congo to Kosovo: Civilian Police in Peace Operations', *Adelphi Paper* 343 (London: IISS, 2002); A. Bellamy and P. Williams, *Understanding Peacekeeping*, Second Edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2010), pp. 377-96.

¹⁰ UN, *Summary of United Nations Peace-keeping Forces by Countries* (30 November 1990), online available: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/1990/1990.zip> (accessed 17 March 2016); UN, *Contributors to United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (31 January 2016), online available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/jan16_1.pdf (accessed 17 March 2016).

¹¹ UNTAC had 3,600+ civilian police; UNPROFOR 600+.

¹² Article 99 of UN Charter.

¹³ R. Mani, 'Peaceful settlement of disputes and conflict prevention' in T. Weiss and S. Daws (eds) *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 309-10.

¹⁴ UN Secretary-General, *An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping*, A/47/277 - S/24111 (17 June 1992).

1990s.¹⁵ Finally, in a number of countries there is no need to deploy blue helmets. In Iraq and Afghanistan, for example, the ‘peacekeeping’ forces were provided by other actors. As such, the UN only concentrates on civilian tasks resulting in the deployment of political missions.¹⁶

| Organisation | Actions in conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding |
|-----------------------|---|
| European Union | Civilian CSDP missions |
| | Military CSDP missions |
| | EU Delegations |
| | EU Special Representatives |
| | Peacebuilding and development projects |
| United Nations | Political and peacebuilding missions |
| | Civilian components of peacekeeping missions |
| | Military component of peacekeeping missions |
| | UN Envoys |
| | UN Country teams |
| | UN Agencies |
| OSCE | OSCE Missions |
| | OSCE Election Observation Missions |
| | OSCE Envoys |

Table 1. Actions by EU, UN and OSCE in conflict prevention and peacebuilding

Actions in bold italics are analysed in this report. See further methodological appendix. Source: compilation by authors.

OSCE missions are clearly a post-Cold War phenomenon. They were initially a reaction to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the wars in former Yugoslavia (1991-95; 1998-99; 2001). Following the Helsinki Summit of July 1992, the OSCE launched ‘missions of long duration’ to Kosovo, Sandjak, and Vojvodina as well as the Spillover Monitor Mission to Skopje in September 1992.¹⁷ In addition to these missions in former Yugoslavia, the OSCE deployed missions to Estonia, Latvia, Moldova and Georgia to help with the political transition, and minority and human rights. Following the conclusion of the wars in

¹⁵ R. Paris, ‘Post-conflict peacebuilding’ in T. Weiss and S. Daws (eds) *The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 406-10.

¹⁶ Paris, ‘Post-conflict peacebuilding’ (2007), pp. 410-11.

¹⁷ CSCE at the time. CSCE, 15th meeting of Committee of Senior Officials, Prague (14 August 1992), Journal No. 2, Annex 1. Online available: <http://www.osce.org/documents/16159?download=true> (accessed 21 March 2016).

former Yugoslavia, the OSCE became active in peacebuilding. During the late 1990s and early 2000s, the OSCE also started field activities in Central Asia, which typically have a light footprint. The Kosovo Verification Mission, which was withdrawn in March 1999 due to the NATO airstrikes, was the biggest OSCE mission to date with 1,500 staff.¹⁸ The deployment of the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine in 2014 has led to a revival of OSCE missions. It consists of almost 600 civilian monitors.¹⁹

The EU is the latest international organisation to deploy civilian missions. Following the creation of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)²⁰ at the Cologne European Council in 1999, the EU established its first civilian mission only in January 2003. The EU Police Mission (EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina took over the responsibility for police training and police reform from the UN. Since 2003, however, the EU has established a wide range of civilian CSDP missions. Some of the most significant include police training in Afghanistan (2007-present), a monitoring mission in Georgia (2008-present) and a large-scale rule of law mission in Kosovo (2008-present). Civilian CSDP missions are kept strictly separate from military CSDP operations and from other civilian EU actions (with command/control and financial consequences).

The EU, UN and OSCE thus all deploy civilian missions. It is, however, not straightforward to compare them. Whereas the EU makes a distinction between civilian and military missions, UN peacekeeping missions often have civilian and military components. Furthermore, while the EU Special Representatives (EUSRs) are not part of the civilian missions, similar roles in the UN and OSCE are often precisely labelled as missions. For the purpose of this report, we have taken a narrow definition of civilian missions. Rather than trying to describe all civilian actions in conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding, we prefer to go into more depth.²¹ Table 1 provides an overview of the civilian actions we analyse in this report (in bold and italics). Our focus is on civilian crisis management. We exclude political ‘good offices’ missions from our report.

2.2. TRENDS IN CIVILIAN MISSIONS SINCE 2003

While the UN and OSCE had already become very active with civilian missions during the early-1990s, the starting point for our analysis is 2003. In 2003, the EU deployed its first CSDP mission (EUPM), which was coincidentally also civilian in nature. Figure 1 plots the number of UN, EU and OSCE missions (left y-axis) as well as the total civilian deployments by these three organisations (right y-axis). The total civilian deployments are on a logarithmic scale to allow for comparisons between the three organisations (as the UN deploys significantly more civilians than the EU and OSCE). This makes it, however, more difficult to identify trends for the individual organisations. It is worthwhile to discuss these data in greater detail.

Because the CSDP was only launched in 2003, it is not surprising that the EU has seen the most significant development in terms of the total number of missions in the 2003-15 timeframe: from two missions at the end of 2003 to eleven ongoing missions in 2015. Interestingly, the number of EU missions increased significantly in 2005 (including Aceh;

¹⁸ OSCE, *Kosovo Verification Mission (Closed)* (n.d.), online available: <http://www.osce.org/node/44552> (accessed 4 April 2016).

¹⁹ OSCE, *OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine - The Facts* (9 October 2015), online available: <http://www.osce.org/ukraine-smm/116879> (accessed 4 April 2016).

²⁰ European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) at the time.

²¹ The EU-CIVCAP project addresses the different dimensions in other reports.

Democratic Republic of Congo; FYROM; Iraq; Rafah) and has been relatively stable since. As some of these earlier missions came to an end, the EU deployed important new missions to Afghanistan (2007-present), Kosovo (2008-present) and Georgia (2008-present). And in the period 2012-14, there has again been an increase in the number of missions dealing with the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and the situation in Ukraine. Overall, however, the number of EU missions has remained stable over the last decade.




Figure 1. UN, EU and OSCE missions (left y-axis) and deployments (right y-axis)

Sources: UN peacekeeping website, SIPRI Yearbooks, OSCE annual reports. See also methodological appendix.

The personnel numbers in the EU missions show a slightly different pattern from the one described above, particularly in the first half of the examined period. From the initial level of 590 in 2003 deployments rose to 974 in 2005, a sizeable increase but not in line with five-fold increase in the number of missions. Moreover, in 2006 this number dropped by half, to 493, reflecting the decision to downsize the two biggest missions at the time (in Aceh and Bosnia). The personnel numbers grew again to 2,521 in 2008, mostly reflecting the launch of the missions in Georgia and particularly in Kosovo. For the next two years they stayed relatively stable, reaching the peak of 2,531 in 2010. Since 2010, a decreasing trend can be observed, most pronounced with the contraction to 1,595 staff in 2014, which was an outcome of the downsizing of the Kosovo mission.

Compared with the EU, the UN is a more established peacekeeping actor, with a considerably larger number of missions (more than double that of the EU in 2015) and an even bigger difference in number of mission personnel (over 11 times than that of the EU

in 2014). About two-thirds of the missions are peacekeeping operations, while one-third are political missions. We see a slightly inverted U-curve in terms of the total number of UN missions. The number of missions has gone up from 22 missions in 2003 to a record of 27 missions in 2008, 2011 and 2012. Since then one can again observe a slight decrease to 24 in 2015. This has been the result of the closure of some small political missions, but also the curtailment of the large peacekeeping missions in Sudan (UNMIS, ended in July 2011) and East-Timor (UNMIT, ended in December 2012).

The number of personnel deployed in the UN missions has significantly increased in the last decade, rising from 8,312 in 2003 to 19,474 in 2015. This mirrors the significant increase in peacekeeping deployments by the UN, which reached 107,000+ uniformed personnel in 2015,²² following the 're-invention' of UN peacekeeping in 1999 and the keynote *Brahimi report* of 2000.²³ While in absolute numbers the civilian components of UN peacekeeping operations are normally much smaller than the military components, the increased importance of multidimensional missions during the 2000s has put greater emphasis on the civilian dimension. Although the political missions are often smaller than the civilian components of peacekeeping operations, the political missions in Afghanistan, Iraq, and to a lesser extent Libya, also contribute to increased civilian UN deployments.

The OSCE shares some of the same turf with the EU (see also section 2.3 below), but the emergence of the EU as a crisis manager since 2003 has hardly undermined its efforts. Overall, the number of OSCE missions has remained quite stable in the period under analysis, with a slight decrease in 2011-13. More recently, however, the OSCE has deployed two new missions in response to the crisis in Ukraine, bringing the total number back to eighteen missions. What is also striking about the OSCE is the rather high number of missions. To some extent this is an exaggeration, as several of the activities by the OSCE mission activities would be carried out in the EU by EU Delegations, which are not part of our analysis. And yet, there seems to be a broad demand for the services of the OSCE.

Conversely, the number of personnel in the OSCE shows a clear decrease throughout most of the period under analysis; from 873 in 2003 to 409 in 2013. However, this consistent decline came to an abrupt end in 2014, when the OSCE deployed the two missions to Ukraine, thereby increasing the personnel levels to 796 in 2014. These increases are likely to continue bringing the total civilian staff of the OSCE to perhaps even higher levels than those of 2003. On the whole, however, OSCE missions tend to be small and often have only a handful or few dozen deployed staff members.

To conclude on the trends in civilian missions, it is possible to make three observations. First, the CSDP, and the establishment of its missions since 2003, has hardly affected the UN and the OSCE. The number of UN peacekeeping and political missions has slightly increased, while the OSCE has recently revived after a decade of decline. Second, and closely related, the combined civilian deployments by the EU, UN and OSCE are at record levels and have been high for at least a decade. It goes without saying that this puts significant demands on the available capabilities. Third, despite the importance of the EU and OSCE in terms of civilian missions, both organisations are still a long way off from the UN effort, which is of a different magnitude. It is therefore important to further investigate the division of labour (geographically and in terms of mandates) to understand what type of capabilities these organisations need.

²² UN, *Monthly summary of military and police contribution to United Nations operations* (n.d.), online available at <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/Yearly.pdf> (accessed 4 April 2016).

²³ UN, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (17 August 2000), A/55/305-S/2000/809.

2.3. GEOGRAPHICAL DEPLOYMENT OF CIVILIAN MISSIONS

In addition to analysing the number of missions and total mission personnel, it is necessary to get a better insight where the different missions are deployed. Figure 2 provides an overview of the total number of EU, UN and OSCE missions per geographical region in 2015. It is clear that Africa has the strongest international presence, with nineteen missions, closely followed by Europe with eighteen. There are nine missions in Central Asia, six in the Middle East and one mission in Haiti. There is to an extent a geographical division of labour between the EU, UN and OSCE. The UN, as a universal international organisation, is present in all regions. The OSCE is only present in its member states.²⁴ The EU has a significant presence in its immediate but increasingly also wider neighbourhood. This reflects its ambition to bring stability to neighbouring regions.




Figure 2. Number of EU, UN and OSCE missions per region in 2015

The regions include the Americas, Europe including the Caucasus, Africa, Middle-East and Asia (from left to right). The size of the pie-charts is not completely proportional to the total number of missions in each region. See further methodological appendix.

The EU deployment patterns are the reflection of different issues. First, the CSDP was established during the late 1990s as a reaction to the inadequate response of the EU to the wars in former Yugoslavia. Unsurprisingly, the EU has a strong presence in the Western Balkans, but also Ukraine and Georgia. Second, EU member states have had diverse interests in sub-Saharan Africa as a result of their colonial pasts. Coupled with the ambition of some member states for the CSDP to be more than a regional policy, this has resulted in missions in Democratic Republic of Congo. Third, as the EU is a member of the Middle East Peace Process, it has also made niche capabilities available in the Palestinian Territories. Finally, more recently, the EU seems to take a more strategic approach to its deployments with police training in Afghanistan, counter-piracy missions off the coast of Somalia, and capacity-building missions (to combat terrorism) in the Sahel region.

The situation is different in the UN, where peacekeeping and political operations largely follow some of the world's major conflicts (as well as the interests of the permanent five

²⁴ Kosovo is not a participating state of the OSCE.

members of the Security Council). Africa is, in this respect, the continent with the highest number of missions (in Central African Republic, Côte d'Ivoire, Democratic Republic of Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, two missions in Sudan, Western Sahara and regional missions in Central Africa and West Africa). The other regions host comparatively fewer missions but, with the highest number of missions in general, the UN is still an active player in all of them. Namely, at the time of writing, four missions were deployed in the Middle East (in Iraq, Lebanon, Syria and a regional truce mission covering the whole region), three in Asia (in Afghanistan, India and Pakistan, and regional mission in Central Asia), two in Europe (Cyprus and Kosovo) and, as mentioned above, one in Haiti.

Finally, the OSCE activities are concentrated in its member states in Europe and Central Asia. As can be seen on Figure 2, OSCE missions are dominant in both regions. No fewer than thirteen missions are located in Europe (in Albania, Baku, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, to Minsk Conference, in Moldova, Montenegro, Serbia, Skopje, Yerevan, and three missions inside Ukraine or at Ukrainian-Russian border) and five missions in Central Asia (Astana, Ashgabat, Bishkek, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan). It is important, however, to once more point out that OSCE missions are often small deployments. They also often carry out functions that in the EU fall under the responsibility of the EU delegations rather than civilian CSDP (see below).

2.4. THE MANDATES OF CIVILIAN MISSIONS

It is now clear how many missions and personnel the EU, UN and OSCE deploy. It is also clear where they deploy them. The final question is actually what these missions do. Without more detail on their functions, it is impossible to make statements on the required civilian capabilities. On the basis of the mandates of ongoing missions in 2015, ten types of conflict prevention, crisis management and peacebuilding tasks can be identified. Overall, an average mission deployed by the EU, UN and OSCE carried out 3.15 tasks. Contrary to popular wisdom on the comprehensive approach and multidimensional missions, this shows that the missions' mandates tend to be focused.

In comparison to the other two organisations, the EU deployed relatively focused civilian missions. An average EU mission in 2015 was mandated 2.18 tasks. The most common task was support to police, with just over half of the missions carrying it out (six of eleven missions), followed by Security Sector Reform (SSR) and border management (each by four of the eleven missions). Four other tasks were each carried out by two different EU missions each: anti-terrorism / anti-piracy activities, support to judiciary, mediation, and support to armed forces. Only one mission was responsible for monitoring the implementation of a peace agreement (Georgia) and none of the missions dealt with Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR).

The situation was slightly different for the UN, which had the most comprehensive missions of the three organisations – on average 3.63 tasks per mission. It was also the only organisation which covered all ten identified tasks across its missions. For the UN, the most common task by far was the monitoring of peace agreements, conducted by 18 of 24 missions.²⁵ Similar to the EU, support to police was also an important component (fifteen missions). SSR followed with eleven missions; and DDR, and support to both police and judiciary were dealt with by ten missions. Other tasks were less common: riot control was carried out by six missions, support to armed forces by three missions, and both counter-terrorism / anti-piracy activities and border management by two missions.

²⁵ This includes, for example, monitoring the human rights situation in a country. Abuses of human rights can undermine the sustainability of peace.

Finally, the OSCE missions were situated in between the EU and UN as concerns the breadth of their activities. On average they carried out 3.11 tasks. Contrary to the UN and especially to the EU, support to the judiciary was the most common task, with 14 of 18 OSCE missions addressing this. Almost equally important was support to police, in line with the other two organisations, with twelve missions working in this field. Counter-terrorism / anti-piracy activities as well as border management were also rather common tasks, although slightly less so, with respectively eight and seven missions addressing them. Other activities were less common: mediation was carried out by five missions; monitoring, support to armed forces and SSR by three; and only one mission dealt with DDR. Finally, riot control was not part of the mandate of any OSCE mission, which is unsurprising given the lack of executive functions possessed by the organisation. In general, OSCE mandates seem to be quite general when the actual (limited) resources of the missions are taken into account.




Figure 3. Tasks of EU, UN and OSCE ongoing missions mentioned in their formal mandates (as of 31 December 2015).

100% implies that all missions of organisation A carry out task Z. See further methodological appendix.

3. MECHANISMS FOR MISSION PLANNING AND RESOURCING: EU, UN AND OSCE

3.1. THE EU AND CSDP MISSIONS

3.1.1. Overview of the CSDP planning process

The EU deploys civilian and military operations under the framework of the CSDP, as well as a limited number of operations with a hybrid civil-military character.²⁶ The distinction between civilian missions and military operations is important, as they have different planning procedures and command structures. They are also resourced differently in terms of personnel, budget and material capabilities. The mechanisms for civilian missions are more centralised and Brussels-based than those of military operations.²⁷

The planning of civilian and military operations involves a number of documents drafted by EU bodies and adopted by the member states in the Council. These documents include the Crisis Management Concept (CMC), Military or Civilian Strategic Options (MSOs/CSOs), the Council Decision, the Concept of Operations (CONOPS), and the Operations Plan (OPLAN). Not all of these documents are always required and some steps may be skipped when rapid response is required.²⁸ They can be complemented by informal options papers and are often informed by EU fact-finding missions and information from other international actors.

The initial stage of the planning process (strategic planning) is largely similar for both civilian and military operations. It starts with a paper on the Political Framework for Crisis Approach (PFCA) drafted by the geographical desk in the EEAS to provide a comprehensive approach to crises. This is informed by consultations within the EEAS-led Crisis Platform. Following a green light from the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the integrated Crisis Management Planning Directorate (CMPD) in the EEAS takes the lead. It drafts the CMC for adoption by the Council, which is the first planning document. The document explains “what to do, why, where and with whom” and sets out the overall parameters of a mission.²⁹ Following the revised 2013 Crisis Management Procedures, the CMC is accompanied by a Council Decision and a Budgetary Impact Statement. This allows a Head of Mission/Commander to be appointed, the headquarters to be activated, and gives immediate access to the budget of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).³⁰

²⁶ For a complete overview see the website of the EEAS, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/index_en.htm (accessed 29 January 2016).

²⁷ Council of the European Union, *Draft Guidelines for Command and Control Structure for EU Civilian Operations in Crisis Management*, 9919/07 (23 May 2007); Y. De Kermabon, ‘Crisis Management Procedures’ in J. Rehl (ed.) *Handbook for Decision Makers: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union* (Vienna: Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2014); A. Mattelaer, ‘The CSDP Mission Planning Process of the European Union: Innovations and Shortfalls’, in S. Vanhoonacker, H. Dijkstra and H. Maurer (eds) ‘Understanding the Role of Bureaucracy in the European Security and Defence Policy’, *European Integration online Papers (EIoP)*, Special Issue 1, 14 (2010), <http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2010-009a.htm>; H. Dijkstra, *Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense: An Institutional Perspective* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

²⁸ De Kermabon, ‘Crisis Management Procedures’ (2014), p. 45.

²⁹ EEAS website, *Crisis Management and Planning Directorate*, http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/structures-instruments-agencies/cmpd/index_en.htm (accessed 29 January 2016).

³⁰ T. Tardy, ‘CSDP in Action: What contribution to International Security’, *Chaillot Paper* 134 (Paris: EU-ISS, 2015), pp. 25-6. The latter is important as the CFSP budget is much larger than the EEAS administrative budget. Due to this Council Decision, money becomes available for fact-finding missions as well as the mission start-up phase.

Box 1: EU Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX)

EULEX is the largest EU civilian mission deployed to date. It was launched in February 2008, days before the unilateral declaration of independence of Kosovo, but it became fully operational only in April 2009. At its peak it consisted of almost 1,700 international personnel, including from five non-EU contributors (Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey and the US). It is currently below 700 as the mission is phasing out. EULEX engages in ‘Monitoring, Mentoring and Advising (MMA)’ working with Kosovo institutions, judicial authorities and law enforcement agencies. Uniquely for the EU, it also has executive functions, concentrated on prosecuting war crimes, organised crime and high level corruption as well as other serious crimes.



Photo credits: ©EULEX

One of the most challenging tasks has been bringing the rule of law to the North of Kosovo, an area inhabited by the Serbian minority not recognising Kosovo institutions. The political situation was particularly difficult before the start of Pristina-Belgrade dialogue in 2011. EULEX faced, among others, the destruction of crossing points at the border with Serbia and violent clashes between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians. EULEX was accused by part of Kosovo Serbian population for supporting Kosovo’s government, and therefore not being neutral. On the other hand, the mission also evoked criticism from Albanians for allegedly being too cautious in its activities in the North. The mission still maintains a Formed Police Unit to intervene in the area if necessary.

Once the CMC is adopted, the EU Military Staff (EUMS) drafts the MSOs and the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC) drafts the CSOs.³¹ Following the Strategic Options, civilian and military planning processes start to diverge. Civilian planning stays in Brussels, while military planning moves to the Operations Headquarters (OHQ) located in one of the

³¹ CSOs are regularly skipped in civilian CSDP planning. More emphasis is placed on the initial CMC. Decisions get front-loaded before substantial planning can take place.

member states.³² The two key documents for operational planning are the CONOPS and OPLAN. To simplify, the CONOPS provides an ideal overview of the mission plan. It also includes the commander's 'wish list' in terms of the capabilities needed. The Operations Plan, on the other hand, is a more detailed version of the CONOPS, based on the actual capability commitments of the member states. The civilian CONOPS and OPLAN are drafted by the Civilian Operations Commander in the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), while the military documents are drafted by the Operations Commander in the OHQ.

Once the OPLAN is approved by the Council, the operation can be formally launched through a second Council Decision. This also sets the budget for civilian missions. Civilian missions are commanded by the Civilian Operations Commander in the CPCC, but in reality the appointed Head of Mission on the ground and the local mission headquarters have considerable discretion.³³ Military missions are commanded by the Operations Commander in the OHQ, which has direct authority over the Force Commander in the Force Headquarters (FHQ) on the ground. All commanders and heads of mission regularly appear in the PSC where the national ambassadors provide them with strategic guidance.

3.1.2. Resources for civilian CSDP missions

Force generation for military operations is relatively straightforward. During the force generation conferences, member states make military contingents and/or enablers (e.g. logistics, transport, medical facilities) available. These military contingents are normally self-sustained units, trained as a unit with their own equipment. Member states pay for their contributions themselves on the basis of the 'costs lie where they fall' principle, ensure rotations of military staff and make sure that their soldiers arrive on time.³⁴ The problem is that member states may neither be willing nor able to make sufficient contributions, but the process itself is not overly complicated.

Civilian force generation is very different. With the exception of the Integrated Police Units (IPUs; e.g. riot control police), all deployed civilian personnel must be recruited on an individual basis.³⁵ This includes not only the staff at the mission headquarters, but also every single monitor, policeman, judge, prosecutor, customs official and penitentiary official. Furthermore, civilian CSDP missions are largely paid for through the CFSP budget, which is also managed by the Brussels institutions. As such, resourcing the civilian missions requires considerable human resources management and financial administration.

To better understand when and how civilian missions are resourced, it is important to start with the budget. Civilian missions are, for the most part, funded through the EU budget.³⁶ Under budgetary section III 'Commission', there is title 19 'Foreign policy instruments',

³² OHQs are available in France, Germany, Greece, Italy and the United Kingdom. The EU can also use the NATO infrastructure through the Berlin Plus agreement of 2003. If none of these options are available, the EU can activate its Operations Centre within the EUMS.

³³ Council of the European Union, *Draft Guidelines* (2007).

³⁴ Only a small proportion of the budget, the so-called common costs, is carried by the all the member states through the Athena mechanism. Council Decision, *Establishing a mechanism to administer the financing of the common costs of European Union operations having military or defence implications (Athena)*, 2011/871/CFSP (19 December 2011).

³⁵ Federica Mogherini questions this practice with a view to rapid response, High Representative, *Contribution to the June 2015 European Council* (2015) p. 8, http://eeas.europa.eu/csdp/documents/pdf/report-ahead_european-defence-agency.pdf (accessed 8 February 2016).

³⁶ Article 42(2) TEU.

which includes chapters on the CFSP (€327 million), the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (€254 million), the Partnership Instrument (€120 million), Election Observation Missions (€45 million) and Information Outreach (€12 million).³⁷ The largest part of the 'CFSP budget' goes into civilian CSDP missions, but it also pays for the EU Special Representatives, for support for non-proliferation and disarmament mostly provided to other international organisations, and for emergency, preparatory and follow-up measures.³⁸

The organisation of the budget is significant, as its design has implications. First, the budget is negotiated in the context of the seven-year Multiannual Financial Framework, which sets some of the parameters. The budget is then negotiated in more detail annually. This method of accounting makes it difficult to make money available to respond to unforeseen crises, such as the conflict in Ukraine in 2014. The launch of the mission in Ukraine was, for example, "possible only because of the transfer of funds from other budget headings".³⁹ While the CFSP budget has increased significantly over time, which creates more flexibility in case of emergencies, advance budgetary planning remains difficult. Second, the EU budget is negotiated between the member states and the European Parliament. It is administered by the European Commission. As such, decisions on the CFSP budget involve a considerable number of actors.

The budget for each individual civilian mission is determined in its Council Decision and the accompanying Budgetary Impact Statement. Because the EU budget provides the largest part of the financial resources, member states first need to agree on the CONOPS and the required civilian capabilities. The CONOPS provides sufficient detail (e.g. the number of staff members) to determine the overall budget of the mission. The Council Decision concerns the full duration of the mission, which typically covers a couple of years, which means that the mission's overall budget still needs to be brought into line with the EU's annual budgetary cycle. The Council Decisions are negotiated by the member states, in close consultation with the EEAS and the Commission.

In terms of the staffing of the missions, there is an important distinction between seconded officials and international and locally contracted staff. While the latter are fully paid for by the CFSP budget, the costs of seconded officials are normally split between the EU and the contributing member states.⁴⁰ The member states cover the salaries of the outgoing seconded personnel, while the EU covers per diems as well as hardship and risk allowances which staff receive on top of their salaries.⁴¹ Due to this difference between seconded and internationally contracted staff, it is important to get the balance right. Preference is given to the seconded officials, who make up the majority of the civilian staff.

The Head of Mission is responsible for staff recruitment and personnel policy. He/she is normally supported by a Human Resources officer/unit within the mission. The CPCC's Mission Support Division facilitates the process, but only has limited HRM resources due to

³⁷ European Commission, *DRAFT General budget of the European Union for the financial year 2016*, VOLUME 3, Appropriations 2016 (24 June 2015), p. III/905.

³⁸ European Commission, *DRAFT General budget* (2015), p. III/918-928.

³⁹ High Representative, *Contribution to the June 2015 European Council* (2015), p. 9.

⁴⁰ F. Terpan, 'Financing Common Security and Defence Policy operations: explaining change and inertia in a fragmented and flexible structure', *European Security* 24:2 (2014), appendix 1.

⁴¹ Terpan, 'Financing Common Security and Defence Policy operations' (2014), appendix 1.

stringent budgetary rules on administrative expenditure in Brussels.⁴² The recruitment of personnel starts with the mission informing the CPCC about vacancies. The CPCC circulates a Call for Contributions (CfC) among the member states and sets up the selection panels. The Head of Mission then endorses the selection result. The EU is developing software (Goalkeeper) which includes standard job descriptions, an overview of training opportunities and a roster of deployable personnel.⁴³

While staff members are recruited on an individual basis, the member states have a significant responsibility. This not only involves putting forward candidates for secondment, but also putting together a pool of deployable personnel, providing pre-deployment training and ensuring that sufficient career opportunities are available for redeployed staff members. Critically important, in this respect, is the role of the ministries of interior and justice. While the civilian missions are normally negotiated by foreign affairs diplomats, the other ministries have to actually make the staff available.⁴⁴ Most interior and justice ministries do not adequately prepare staff for missions outside of national territory.⁴⁵ Many member states provide some pre-deployment training. Several pan-EU courses have also been developed, including through the European Security and Defence College (ESDC), but improvements can still be made.

While personnel take up the large majority of the budget and efforts in civilian missions, a range of material capabilities is required as well. The EU has a warehouse in Germany which provides vehicles and other equipment during the deployment phase. An upgrade to the warehouse is being discussed, in light of a new tender, to ensure that it plays a role during and after re-deployment. The EU increasingly uses framework contracts, negotiated with suppliers for a longer period of time. The rules of procurement have furthermore recently been made more flexible to take account of the difficult situation in which civilian missions are deployed.

3.2. UN PEACEKEEPING AND POLITICAL MISSIONS

3.2.1. Overview of the UN planning process

The UN deploys peacekeeping operations and political missions. It is difficult to neatly demarcate both as there is considerable overlap. Peacekeeping operations almost always include troops and/or military observers and often have a (sizeable) civilian component.⁴⁶ Political missions, on the other hand, are mostly civilian.⁴⁷ In terms of authorised strength, both peacekeeping and political missions vary considerably. Peacekeeping operations can be significant due to the military component, but civilian uniformed personnel ranges from a few dozen to several hundreds. Political missions can be very small, but some also

⁴² The EU has agreed to establish a Mission Support Platform for all civilian missions, which should be operational by the end of 2016 (see further below).

⁴³ R. Badoux, 'Training and Recruitment for Civilian Missions' in J. Rehl (ed.) *Handbook for Decision Makers: The Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Union* (Vienna: Directorate for Security Policy of the Federal Ministry of Defence and Sports of the Republic of Austria, 2014).

⁴⁴ A. Jacobs, 'EU Civilian Crisis Management: A Crisis in the Making?', *CSS Analysis in Security Policy* 87 (2011), online available: <http://e-collection.library.ethz.ch/eserv/eth:2952/eth-2952-01.pdf> (accessed 2 February 2016).

⁴⁵ High Representative, *Contribution to the June 2015 European Council* (2015), p. 13.

⁴⁶ The UN Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) is a peacekeeping operation that notably does not include troops; the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) is an example that does not include a civilian component.

⁴⁷ The UN Mission Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) has a guard unit of deployed troops.

Box 2. United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)

UNMISS was deployed after the independence of South Sudan in July 2011. The independence of South Sudan was the final step of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Sudan and South Sudan of 2005. After the six-year Interim Period, the people of South Sudan voted in a referendum for secession. As the world's newest state, it was clear that South Sudan would require significant support. While the emphasis of UNMISS was initially on strengthening the capacity of the local government, it soon became clear that UNMISS would have a major responsibility in the protection of civilians. In December 2013, widespread inter-communal violence broke leading to a sharp deterioration in the humanitarian situation. The situation got worse in 2016. About 2.3 million people have been displaced with 200,000 seeking refuge near the UN peacekeeping camps (S/2016/138: para 22).



Photo credits: ©UNMISS

As a result of this conflict, the UN increased the military strength of UNMISS from the original 7,000 peacekeepers to nearly 12,000 in 2016. As of early 2016, more than 2,500 civilians are working for UNMISS. In total, it has an authorised police strength of 2,000 officers, but it still has a significant number of vacancies. India, Rwanda, Nepal, Ethiopia and China are the biggest overall contributors. Ghana, Nepal and Rwanda have FPU in South Sudan, while there were more than 30 police contributing countries early 2016.

That such a significant crisis would break out was not foreseen when UNMISS deployed. As a result, it now focuses mostly on the protection of civilians. This involves many different activities. Under the traditional 'good offices' role, UNMISS organises meetings with local authorities and civil society to promote dialogue, peace and reconciliation. UNMISS also provides physical protection at six sites for refugees. This includes patrols, investigating security incidents including human rights violations, community policing and search operations. As a result of these challenges related to the protection of civilians, UNMISS is hardly capable of strengthening the government institutions of South Sudan in the area of rule of law.

include hundreds of international staff, as is the case in Afghanistan. In terms of the legal mandate there is no clarity either. Political missions are launched under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, while peacekeeping operations have both Chapter VI and VII mandates.⁴⁸

The UN planning process is described in the policy document *Integrated Assessment and Planning* and revolves around a number of planning documents.⁴⁹ The difference with the EU is that while all major EU planning documents are adopted by the member states, within the UN, planning documents are solely owned by the actors who drafted them. The documents include the Strategic Assessment, the report of the Technical Assessment Mission and the report of the Secretary-General to the UNSC. The UNSC adopts a resolution, which formally establishes an operation. The Secretary-General appoints the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG), who runs the mission on the ground. Together with the Force Commander and the Police Commissioner, the SRSG takes the lead on operational planning, which includes the Mission Concept and component-level plans.

The UN planning process starts with a Strategic Assessment. This is not unlike the EU's PFCA in that it sets up the broader UN engagement in a conflict. It is written by Secretariat-based Integrated Task Force (ITF), which consists of representatives from across the UN system.⁵⁰ The ITF is chaired by the lead department, either the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) or the Department of Political Affairs (DPA). The Strategic Assessment is an internal document prepared for the Secretary-General and the Policy Committee consisting of senior UN officials. It may propose to initiate planning, a decision made by the Secretary-General.⁵¹

If planning is initiated, the UN normally sends a Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) to the ground. The composition of the TAM is flexible but normally consists of officials from the ITF. If the UN already has a presence on the ground, such as a Country Team, local officials will join. This fact-finding mission of one or two weeks results in a report for the hierarchy in DPKO/DPA and ultimately for the Secretary-General and the Policy Committee.⁵² On the basis of the report of the TAM, the lead department drafts the report of the Secretary-General to the UNSC, which is publicly available. This is the end product of the strategic planning process within the UN Secretariat and from this point onwards, the UNSC takes over.

The UNSC drafts and adopts a resolution, which is the formal legal basis authorising a mission. It includes the legal basis (Chapter VII or not), describes the mandate, the total authorised strength and the reporting and review clauses. In practice, the UNSC resolution is drafted by the so-called 'penholder', often France, the United Kingdom or the United States, depending on the relationship of the prospective penholder with the host country. The designated penholder and several other UNSC members often do their parallel

⁴⁸ Chapter VI is about the 'peaceful settlement of disputes', while Chapter VII is also about 'peace enforcement'.

⁴⁹ UN, *Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning* (13 April 2013), online available: https://undg.org/main/undg_document/un-policy-on-integrated-assessment-and-planning-iap/ (accessed 9 February 2016).

⁵⁰ IAF Working Group, *Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook* (December 2013), pp. 19, 51-2.

⁵¹ United Nations, *Policy on Integrated Assessment and Planning* (2013), paragraph 37.

⁵² H. Dijkstra, *International Organizations and Military Affairs* (London: Routledge, 2016).

planning, including a visit to the ground.⁵³ They are thus not bound by the report of the Secretary-General and the planning carried out by the ITF.

Based on the planning process and the UNSC resolution, the ITF drafts a Directive for the SRSG, which signifies the transfer of planning responsibility to the mission on the ground.⁵⁴ The SRSG and his/her staff will first focus on the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) for the host country. The ISF compares somewhat to the EU comprehensive approach and the regional strategies in that it is much broader than crisis management and peacekeeping. Within the context of the ISF, the SRSG will draft a Mission Concept. The various components of the peacekeeping or political operation (e.g. military, police, political) adopt their component-level CONOPS. While command and control rests with the SRSG, the mission receives guidance and is supported by DPKO, DPA and the Department of Field Support (DFS). Missions also have a regular reporting requirement via the Secretary-General to the UNSC.

3.2.2. Resources for the political and civilian components of UN missions

As with the EU, in the case of UN missions it is useful to distinguish between finance, staff, and equipment and mission support. The Global Field Support Strategy (2010-15) of the DFS, whose aims were to improve rapid response, efficiency and accountability, and the deployment conditions of staff, for instance, similarly addressed these issues.⁵⁵ For the resourcing of UN peacekeeping, we need to distinguish between the military and civilian components. There are also key distinctions between peacekeeping and political missions. Both are supported through DFS, but they are organised differently in terms of the budget. Peacekeeping operations have their own (extraordinary) budget; political missions are paid through the regular UN budget. As was the case with the EU, this section will first discuss the financing of civilian missions. It then evaluates the recruitment and training of civilian staff. This section concludes with a discussion of equipment and mission support.

It is useful to start with the financing of political missions as they fall under the biennial general UN budget. This is paid for by the member states on the basis of their GNI and population size. Poor countries get discounts, UNSC members pay more, and the US benefits from a 22% ceiling. The total UN budget is about \$3 billion per year.⁵⁶ This pays for all regular UN staff, the headquarters and operational expenditure. A fifth of the regular UN budget goes to the political missions (almost \$600 million a year),⁵⁷ which accounts for 90% of the budget of political affairs.⁵⁸ That so much money of the regular budget goes to political missions is a source of tension between the UNSC, which

⁵³ H. Dijkstra, 'Shadow bureaucracies and the unilateral control of international secretariats: Insights from UN peacekeeping', *The Review of International Organizations* 10:1 (2015), pp. 23-41.

⁵⁴ IAF Working Group, *Integrated Assessment and Planning Handbook* (2013), paragraphs 40-1.

⁵⁵ UN Secretary-General, *Global field support strategy*, A/64/633 (26 January 2010); UN DFS, *Global Field Support Strategy 2010-2015: Overview of Context, Objectives, Results and Lessons Learned* (June 2015), online available: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/documents/overview.pdf> (accessed 4 April 2016).

⁵⁶ UN Secretariat, *Assessment of Member States' contributions to the United Nations regular budget for the year 2015*, ST/ADM/SER.B/910 (29 December 2014).

⁵⁷ UN Department of Management, *Regular Budget 2012-2013* (2012), online available: <https://www.un.org/en/hq/dm/pdfs/oppba/Regular%20Budget.pdf> (accessed 16 February 2016).

⁵⁸ UN General Assembly, *Proposed programme budget for the biennium 2016-2017*, A/70/6 (Sect. 3) (27 April 2015), table 3.5.

authorises the missions, and the General Assembly, which authorises the budget.⁵⁹ The inclusion of political missions in the biennial budget also creates problems in terms of flexibility, similar to those of the CFSP budget. As the Secretary-General notes, the “current funding arrangements also do not have the flexibility to respond to the funding requirements that arise during mission start-up, expansion or transition”.⁶⁰

Each peacekeeping operation has its own budget, which is approved by the General Assembly on an annual basis.⁶¹ GNI and population again play a key role, but the payment scale for peacekeeping differs from the UN regular budget. The US, for instance, pays 28% of the peacekeeping budget instead of 22%. It is slightly awkward that UN peacekeeping is considered an extraordinary activity of the UN,⁶² particularly since the peacekeeping budget, at \$8.3 billion, is almost three-times larger than the regular UN budget.⁶³ In addition to the budget of each mission, there is the \$330 million annual support account for peacekeeping. This pays largely for the administrative costs at the New York headquarters.⁶⁴ Furthermore, there is a separate budget for the UN Logistical Base (UNLB) of nearly \$70 million.

In terms of expenditure, there is a key difference between deployed uniformed personnel (soldiers and police) by the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs) and contracted civilian personnel by the missions themselves.⁶⁵ The UN compensates TCCs with a flat-rate reimbursement of \$1,332 for each deployed person per month. The UN furthermore provides deployed uniformed personnel with a minimal allowance depending on the mission. Civilian contracted personnel are fully paid for by the missions themselves. This includes international/UN staff in policy functions, national staff providing administrative support, enabling functions and local expertise as well as UN volunteers. While uniformed personnel substantially outnumber contracted staff, civilian personnel costs in most missions are at least 50% of uniformed personnel costs.⁶⁶ In addition to staff costs, each mission has a budget for operational requirements, such as infrastructure, transportation and supplies.

⁵⁹ A representative from Brazil, for example, calls political missions one of the “most important distortions” in the regular budget, United Nations, *Amid Growing Global Instability, Special Political Missions Crucial for Conflict Prevention, Require Separate Fund, Speakers Tell Fourth Committee* (6 November 2015), online available: <http://www.un.org/press/en/2015/gaspd598.doc.htm> (accessed 16 February 2016).

⁶⁰ UN General Assembly, *Review of arrangements for funding and backstopping special political missions*, A/66/340 (12 October 2011), paragraph 4.

⁶¹ See also N. Sheehan, *The Economics of UN Peacekeeping* (London: Routledge, 2011); K. Coleman, ‘The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping: Incentivizing Effective Participation’, *Providing for Peacekeeping 7* (New York: International Peace Institute, 2014), online available: http://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/publications/ipi_political_economy.pdf (accessed 23 February 2016).

⁶² The High-Level Independent Panel notes that peacekeeping is the most important UN activity and such thus not be treated as exceptional, UN, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on uniting our strengths for peace: politics, partnership and people*, A/70/95 - S/2015/446 (16 June 2015), p. 15.

⁶³ UN General Assembly, *Approved resources for peacekeeping operations for the period from 1 July 2015 to 30 June 2016*, A/C.5/69/24 (26 June 2015).

⁶⁴ While the Brahimi Report took issue with the temporary nature of the support account, it now seems more problematic that political missions have no support account. UN, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations* (2000), p. xiii. This means that shortages at headquarters are with the political rather than the peacekeeping missions. See also UN, *Report of the High-level Independent Panel* (2015), p. 33.

⁶⁵ For further details see Coleman, ‘The Political Economy of UN Peacekeeping’ (2014), pp. 8-12.

⁶⁶ UN General Assembly, *Approved resources* (2015).

While there are two categories of staff in terms of financing (uniformed versus contracted staff), in the terms of recruitment, we need to distinguish between Formed Police Units (FPUs), individual uniformed officers/experts, contracted staff, and the standing capacities. The FPU's merit attention. These are self-sustained units of about 140 deployed personnel, of which at least 120 are police officers.⁶⁷ While they were first deployed around the turn of the century, there has been a rapid increase in their use. By 2011, more police officers were deployed through FPU's than on an individual basis.⁶⁸ In 2016, there are 71 authorised FPU's in UN peacekeeping missions with 8,723 police officers as opposed to 3,362 individual police officers.⁶⁹ Their key functions are public order management, the protection of UN personnel and facilities, and high-visibility patrols and higher risk missions.⁷⁰ FPU's have their own command element as well as equipment and mission support. Because they are self-sustained units, the force generation process is easier with FPU's than it is with individual police. Police contributing countries receive a compensation for the equipment costs of FPU's in addition to the flat-rate compensation for staff.

The selection of individual police officers and contracted staff works in a similar way in the UN as it does in the EU. Once the initial police concept of operations is available, the Selection and Recruitment Section within DPKO can draw up the job profiles, which are circulated to the permanent missions in New York.⁷¹ After an initial check through the applications, tests are organised and selections are made. While the UN has long struggled with a high vacancy rate, which the EU and OSCE also experience, it has made a strong effort to reduce it as part of its Global Field Support Strategy (from 20% to 15%).⁷² This is a major achievement given the overall increase in deployments. It does not imply, however, that the problem is solved. Several missions still have considerable vacancy rates. Furthermore, it is also a question of the quality of personnel or the required niche capacities. An obvious example is the number of individual female police officers: while it has nearly doubled in the period 2009-13 (from 8% to 15%), the number of female police officers remains relatively low.⁷³

A final development has been the creation of standing capacities. Particularly because UN missions struggled to get qualified officers and experts in theatre rapidly, it established a Standing Police Capacity (SPC) in 2006. With a maximum operational capacity of 40 officers, this police capability is modest, but it proved particularly helpful during the start-up phase of new missions. It can also provide assistance to the existing peacekeeping missions.⁷⁴ It is based at the UN Global Service Centre (UNGSC) in Brindisi, Italy. In 2010,

⁶⁷ UN DPKO/DFS, *Policy on Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations* (1 March 2010), online available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/documents/formed_police_unit_policy_032010.pdf (accessed 11 April 2016), paragraphs 20-1.

⁶⁸ W. Durch and M. Ker, 'Police in UN Peacekeeping: Improving Selection, Recruitment, and Deployment', *Providing for Peacekeeping* 6 (New York: International Peace Institute, 2013), table 1 and figure 2.

⁶⁹ UN, *Formed Police Units* (n.d.), online available: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/sites/police/units.shtml> (accessed 11 April 2016). UN, *UN Missions Summary of Military and Police* (2016), online available: http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/contributors/2016/feb16_6.pdf (accessed 11 April 2016).

⁷⁰ UN DPKO/DFS, *Policy on Formed Police Units* (2010), paragraphs 12-5.

⁷¹ Durch and Ker, 'Police in UN Peacekeeping' (2013), pp. 13-4.

⁷² Durch and Ker, 'Police in UN Peacekeeping' (2013), pp. 15-6, table 2, figure 3a, 3b; UN Secretary-General, *Fifth annual progress report on the implementation of the global field support strategy*, A/69/651 (9 December 2014), paragraph 12(e). UN DFS, *Global Field Support Strategy 2010-15*, p. 3.

⁷³ Durch and Ker, 'Police in UN Peacekeeping' (2013), table 3a.

⁷⁴ Durch and Ker, 'Police in UN Peacekeeping' (2013), table 3a.

the SPC was complemented by a modest Justice and Correction Standing Capacity (JCSC) of five persons.⁷⁵ While these standing capacities are relatively small in the context of total UN deployments, it is a niche capacity that helps the UN to more rapidly launch missions and provide expertise when necessary.

In terms of training, there are important distinctions as well between personnel from the member states and internationally recruited staff. Pre-deployment training is organised by the member states themselves: it is a general course on UN peacekeeping missions and has to be based on UN training standards. There is a very substantial number of training manuals available as well as a recognised network of training institutes. For internationally recruited civilian personnel, the UN Integrated Training Service (ITS) provides pre-deployment training at the Global Service Centre. Finally, the missions themselves organise mission induction training. This is mission and host country-specific training. It is coordinated by Integrated Mission Training Centres (IMTCs) within the peacekeeping missions themselves.

In terms of equipment and support, the UN has set up an elaborate mission support structure. Aside from the administrative offices of DFS in New York, the UNGSC in Brindisi, Italy, plays a central role. It is the logistical base for all UN entities, including the Funds, Programmes and Agencies. It has a warehouse and direct access to Brindisi airport. The UNGSC also provides expert teams for the start-up phase of missions. In addition to the UNGSC, the UN has the Regional Service Centre in Entebbe, Uganda. Since many UN missions are deployed in insecure regions, the idea is to pool all non-essential administrative tasks in a more secure location. The centre in Entebbe, for example, does payroll, ICT and training for the peacekeeping operations in East and Central Africa.

3.3. OSCE MISSIONS

3.3.1. Overview of the OSCE planning process⁷⁶

At the helm of OSCE mission planning are the Chairman-in-Office (CiO) and the Conflict Prevention Centre (CPC), which is part of the OSCE secretariat. These structures act in concert to cover the planning and monitoring of mission implementation in coordination with the rest of the secretariat, OSCE field operations, and the special representatives.⁷⁷ In terms of actual planning, the most important department in the CPC is the Operations Services and its Planning and Analysis Unit. Overall, the CPC is charged with the coordination role and works on the mandate for the mission. To do this, it gathers input from every single unit and department in the Secretariat.

The CPC developed the so-called *Operational Framework for Crisis Response* (OFCR) in 2013.⁷⁸ This framework is intended as an internal document on the procedures for use by the OSCE's executive structures to facilitate collective action when addressing a crisis. It draws on good practices and lessons identified from the OSCE's past crisis response

⁷⁵ UN DPKO, *Justice & Corrections: Sustainable Peace through Justice and Security* (2014), online available: <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/cljas/DPKO-Justice-Corrections-Update-2014.pdf> (accessed 11 April 2016), pp. 48-50.

⁷⁶ This section on the OSCE builds on phone interview #10, May 2016.

⁷⁷ OSCE, *OSCE Employment: International Seconded Mission Members* (2016), online available: <http://www.osce.org/node/70273> (accessed May 2016).

⁷⁸ OSCE Ministerial Council, *Elements of the Conflict Cycle, Related to Enhancing the OSCE's Capabilities in Early Warning, Early Action, Dialogue Facilitation and Mediation Support, and Post-Conflict Rehabilitation*, MC.DEC/3/11 (7 December 2011).

Box 3. OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM)

SMM was deployed in March 2014 at the request of Ukrainian government. Its current mandate runs until 31 March 2017. The request itself was triggered by the Russian annexation of Crimea in February, but the mission has focused to a large extent on the conflict erupting in the east of the country soon after its deployment. SMM is the biggest mission which the OSCE has deployed since 2003. It consists of 669 civilian unarmed monitors at the end of 2015. As a matter of comparison, its second biggest mission, in Kosovo, at its peak numbered only 226 international personnel. The monitors come from 47 OSCE participating states; however, the majority of them are EU nationals. Moreover, the EU and its member states contribute around two-third of the budget of the mission.



Photo credits: ©OSCE

The mission's mandate consists of two types of tasks. Firstly, it deals with gathering information and reporting on the ceasefire, the general security situation, specific incidents and the impact of the conflict on the local population. Secondly, the OSCE monitors engage in reducing tensions and facilitating dialogue between the conflicting parties.

The mission's headquarters are in Kiev, but the mission's mandate covers the entire territory of Ukraine. However, what this precisely entails is disputed. In the OSCE Permanent Council, for example, the interpretative statement of Russian delegation annexed to the formal decision 1117, which launched SMM, states that "the Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol have become an integral part of the Russian Federation". Therefore, the monitoring teams have not been granted access to this part of Ukraine. They have only been deployed to Ukraine's other big cities (Chernivtsi, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kharkiv, Kherson, Kiev, Luhansk, Lviv, and Odessa). Finally, SMM is not the only OSCE mission in Ukraine. The mission's activities in eastern Ukraine are complemented by the Observer Mission at the Russian Checkpoints Gukovo and Donetsk.

missions, such as the Special Monitoring Mission after the 2008 war in Georgia and the Community Security Initiative in Southern Kyrgyzstan in 2010. While not establishing fixed guidelines on exactly what should or should not be done, it provides decision-makers and those tasked with implementing decisions with details of existing procedures and an overview of what has worked in the past. The OFCR provides the framework for timely development of an implementation plan and a budget for a mission. Throughout 2016 it is undergoing an update based on the lessons from the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine.

The main decision-making body in the OSCE is the Permanent Council composed of representatives at the level of ambassadors from the 57 participating member states (pMS). The Permanent Council meets in Vienna every week. When an operation is considered, the 'host country' on whose territory the operation will take place has to submit a formal request to the OSCE. Representatives of the host country make the case for the mission during a Permanent Council plenary meeting. This request will then be discussed among the pMS and the respective structures in the Secretariat. It can be an intensive process. As the experience of the Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine in 2014 demonstrated, the decision to deploy can sometimes take weeks of intense political negotiations.

The CiO is an important actor in pushing the mission ahead. It changes every year. The chairmanship has the power to determine if a mission should become a priority and be established. Once the request has been submitted and the chairmanship supports the mission, the Planning and Analysis Unit within CPC's Operation Services starts working on the mandate. In doing so, it liaises with the host country, the chairmanship, and relevant departments of the Secretariat, depending on what the aim of the mandate will be. Once the mandate is set, it is tabled in the Permanent Council where all the pMS vote on it by unanimity. The political decision by the Permanent Council is followed by the publication of the vacancy notices and the mission's Operation Plan. Thereafter, budgeting and staffing start. The CPC's Planning and Analysis Unit again takes the lead, working in close coordination with the Budget Department and the Human Resources Management Department as well as with the host country.

Often a team from the OSCE goes out on the ground before the launch of the mission to conduct local planning. There are no particular documents that prescribe steps for local planning; rather it very much depends on the circumstances. Usually the team is formed in the Secretariat, recruiting personnel from various departments: the CPC, Budget, ICT and Legal Services, etc. Once formed, the team discusses the legal agreement between the OSCE and the host countries, the technical agreement on the provision of venues and equipment, and the needs of purchasing additional equipment. The local planning usually happens only after all the decisions and all the initial planning documents, including the mandate of the mission, have been approved.

3.3.2. Resources for OSCE missions

The OSCE overall budget is negotiated on an annual basis by all member states. It covers the expenses for the whole organisation, including the Secretariat, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) in Warsaw and all the field missions. This is the Unified Budget (UB). The negotiations are the responsibility of the CiO. All of the 57 pMS have to vote on and approve it. The chairmanship is assisted by the Advisory Committee on Management and Finance (ACNF) which comprises representatives of all the pMS. It gathers throughout the year to discuss the planning for the following year and, in particular, what should be changed, and where the budget should be increased or decreased. Also, each mission and each unit in the Secretariat has to submit to the ACNF its respective budget outline for the following year.

In 2016, the Unified Budget is €141.1 million, including secretariat expenditure and field operations.⁷⁹ The Secretariat has a total budget of €36.4 million, of which €4.3 million goes to the CPC. The Human Resources Department has a budget allocation of €5.3 million and the Department for Management and Finance (€8.5 million) has a devoted Mission Support Service (€1.4 million). Interestingly, there are additional funds allocated for field operations under the budget line of “augmentations”. These are separate funds in support of field missions, the biggest share of which goes back to the Secretariat (€4.5m out of €4.7 million overall) for services under its oversight such as: Policy Support Service, Operations Service, ICT, HR, management, finance, communication and media, etc.⁸⁰

Field operations have a total budget allocation of €83.8 million. Each field operation is separately budgeted with budget lines for the Head of Mission’s costs, administrative costs, common costs as well as the costs for the different tasks of the missions. Mission budgets range from €17.9 million (for Kosovo) to €1.6 million (for the Centre in Ashgabat) with the most missions within the €2-7 million range. The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (SMM) is not included in the Unified Budget for 2016, which is significant as the mission amounts to almost €100 million and has a considerable number of personnel on the ground (see Box 3). The SMM in Ukraine is not part of the Unified Budget because of its sheer scale and because it was created as an urgent response to the escalating crisis. Planning of the SMM took place in January 2014 when the work on the Unified OSCE budget was already completed.

Exceptionally, every single post is justified and mentioned in the Unified Budget (annex II). In total the Secretariat has 320.8 full time equivalent (FTE), of which 51 FTE is in the CPC. Augmentations account for an additional 58.5 FTE for the field operations. Secretariat staff and augmentations are for the most part internationally contracted staff and general service staff. Internationally contracted staff members are limited to a 7-years term of employment (the higher ranks for only 4-5 years), and there is a general time limitation of maximum 10-year terms of employment for the OSCE. This means that while staff can move across posts, they can only be with the OSCE for a decade. General service staff members are hired under temporary contracts, which can be renewed continuously.

Most of the OSCE staff members (2,300+ FTE) are serving in field missions. With the exception of some of the leadership functions and the local appointments in the general service, almost all positions in missions are occupied by staff on secondment or national professional officers (local staff in policy functions). When a person is seconded by a pMS, the OSCE does not pay any salary from its own Unified Budget.⁸¹ The only allowance is Board and Lodging Allowance (BLA) as well as travel to/from the mission from Vienna.

A crucial feature of the OSCE when it comes to financing is its flexibility in finding ways to respond to unforeseen circumstances or to act quickly at the early stages of a mission. This is accomplished by either achieving savings within existing operations, or by utilising previously established contingency funds. The Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine, for instance, needed to be quickly deployed. In the absence of both an approved mission budget and an agreed crisis response facility, the OSCE had the option to use a contingency fund previously set aside for financing responses to unforeseen circumstances, augmented by cash savings from previous years. These two sources helped finance the

⁷⁹ OSCE, *Approval of the 2016 Unified Budget*, Decision No. 1197, PC Journal No. 1084, Agenda item 1 (31 December 2015), online available: <http://www.osce.org/pc/215416> (accessed in May 2016).

⁸⁰ OSCE, *Approval of the 2016 Unified Budget* (2015).

⁸¹ OSCE, *OSCE Employment* (2016).

initial set up and daily running of the mission for the first month.⁸² Another important feature is that missions can also be funded by the so-called ‘extra-budgetary projects’. It is up to the programme managers within the missions to devise a project. And they have to do their own fundraising in Vienna.

Identifying and deploying personnel presents a second challenge. The OSCE has developed an internal roster for rapid deployment. This roster gives the OSCE immediate access to information on available staff and their core competencies. The OSCE has tried to develop the Rapid Deployment Roster for some time already.⁸³ The roster would not have been used if it were not for the SMM mission in Ukraine. The concept is based on two steps. First, experienced staff from the OSCE secretariat and other OSCE field missions are designated as ‘first responders’ to form the core of a new OSCE mission. Second, this initial nucleus is replaced under the standard OSCE procedures. In 2013 the OSCE finalised the details of this roster – including potential personnel; key qualifications; generic job descriptions and instructions pertaining to the administrative operation of the roster.⁸⁴

The Rapid Deployment Roster was never used prior to the SSM in Ukraine, and it is thanks to this mission that we have an impression of how the system worked in practice. Although it was still under development at the time, the roster was opened to all OSCE staff members who were willing to be temporarily deployed to Ukraine. Four days after the decision to establish the mission, 31 first responders from the OSCE Secretariat and nine from existing OSCE field operations were identified and deployed in Kiev. These personnel formed the nucleus of the initial monitoring and key command and administrative staff in the mission’s headquarters. Five days later, the first monitors recruited via the regular secondment system arrived as well. Within a month (by the end of April, 2014) all first responder monitors were replaced by regular seconded staff members.⁸⁵

When it comes to training of mission personnel, the OSCE has developed its own in-house training programme which covers the basic requirements towards new OSCE mission members. It is called ‘General Orientation Programme’ and takes place in Vienna. The programme lasts for 5 days and is organised about 8 times per year. It consists of a core training module and function-specific briefings. The former covers most of the training ranging from an introduction to the OSCE to Transnational Threats and the Conflict Cycle, Gender, Ethics, Management, and Media and Decision Making. The latter are geared toward specific training related to a concrete position.⁸⁶ In addition, the CPC has developed its own training programme that offers tailored coaching for high level mediators, intensive mediation training for support staff in conflict areas, as well as basic training for OSCE support staff working on mediation programmes on the ground. Moreover,

⁸² C. Neukirch, ‘Fast tracking monitors to Ukraine: Twenty four hours from decision to deployment, Security Community’, OSCE Magazine 2 (2014), online available: <http://www.osce.org/magazine/122525?download=true> (accessed in May 2016).

⁸³ That is the Rapid Expert Assistance and Co-operation Teams (REACT) and the ‘just-in-time approaches’ (which remained just as ideas, and were never developed as operative approaches)

⁸⁴ C. Neukirch, ‘Early Warning and Early Action - Current Developments in OSCE Conflict Prevention Activities’, OSCE Yearbook 2013 (2014), online available: <http://ifsh.de/en/core/publications/osce-yearbook/yearbook-2013/> (accessed in May 2016).

⁸⁵ Neukirch, ‘Fast tracking monitors to Ukraine’ (2014).

⁸⁶ OSCE Resources, *Pre-arrival Information Package for new OSCE mission members* (2015), online available: <http://www.osce.org/employment/78294> (accessed in May 2016).

the CPC organises high-level mediation coaching sessions for Heads of Missions and Special Representatives and courses on dialogue facilitation for staff members.⁸⁷

A final feature of the OSCE model is the ongoing development of a so-called virtual pool of equipment. This removes the need to store large amounts of physical equipment and yet enables a timely and reliable access to essential material resources – from armoured vehicles to computers – when required.

The OSCE has a warehouse in Vienna with equipment from missions which were closed (e.g. the recent mission in Azerbaijan), but it only stores small amounts of key equipment. When the OSCE develops a mission it normally asks for in-kind contributions from the host authorities, otherwise it purchases everything through the Procurement Unit. In the case of the SMM in Ukraine, everything was purchased rapidly through the procurement database and a special system of contracts that allows for quick deployment. The countries that the OSCE has worked with and currently has missions in have the ‘window contracts’ (or framework contracts) with certain companies. These are especially useful in the case of a mission as the OSCE does not need to go through a vetting process but can purchase without delay.

The creation of the virtual pool is also a recognition of the fact that, since the OSCE is not regularly deploying large missions at short notice (unlike the UN), keeping large amounts of items is not efficient. In particular, this system is designed to meet the needs of a team consisting of up to ten experts who need to be deployed within three days. It delivers essential mission equipment such as: vehicles, satellite and mobile phones, very high frequency radios, GPS, generators, computers and printers, office furniture, personal protective equipment, security cameras, and emergency rations. The usefulness of this tool was demonstrated by the SSM in Ukraine. As a result of the pre-established database and contracts, the OSCE Secretariat made all necessary arrangements within days so that when the OSCE personnel arrived on the field, they already had access to everything required for the mission.⁸⁸

⁸⁷ Neukirch, ‘Early Warning and Early Action’ (2014).

⁸⁸ Neukirch, ‘Fast tracking monitors to Ukraine’ (2014); Neukirch, ‘Early Warning and Early Action’ (2014).

4. CAPABILITIES FOR EU CIVILIAN MISSIONS

This paper has so far provided an overview of civilian missions in the EU, UN and OSCE as well as an introduction to how missions are planned and resourced. It is now time to zoom in on the civilian capabilities of the EU. The report focuses on finance, personnel and equipment. When analysing (civilian) capabilities, it is worth distinguishing between advance and crisis response planning.⁸⁹ The EU engages in advance planning before the eruption of a crisis to be ready to ‘hit the ground running’ when it deploys. Advance planning is about generic concepts, scenarios and options (e.g. a SSR mission to Africa).⁹⁰ Crisis response planning, on the other hand, deals with ‘real crises’ and starts when the possibility of actual EU action is considered appropriate.⁹¹

For the purpose of this paper the distinction between advance and crisis response planning is useful, as they are each closely tied to capabilities. In terms of advance planning, budgets need to be planned, capability catalogues and personnel rosters need to be drawn up, and tender contracts for equipment need to be negotiated. If budgets, personnel and equipment are not in place prior to a crisis, there are likely to be delays in deployment. In terms of crisis response planning, it is about the actual use and deployment of civilian capabilities. A mission budget needs to be established, personnel must be selected and trained, and equipment needs to be purchased. In other words, it is necessary to consider all capabilities in terms of advance and crisis response planning.

4.1. FINANCING OF MISSIONS AND PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES

4.1.1. Multiannual Financial Framework and CFSP budget

The EU’s civilian CSDP missions largely fall under the overall EU budget. While the member states unilaterally continue to pay the salaries of their seconded personnel, other costs such as the per diems are paid for by the EU. The EU also pays for all contracted staff and for the equipment. As such the funding for civilian CSDP missions is significantly different from military CSDP operations, where common costs are administered through the Athena mechanism and thereby kept outside of the regular EU budget. While it remains expensive for member states to contribute civilian staff (as a result of the salary costs involved), the fact that the EU pays for a significant proportion of the expenditure makes the search for contributions slightly easier. On the other hand, due to these arrangements, various EU actors (the European Commission, Council, European Parliament, and European External Action Service) have to negotiate the budget, and civilian missions are subject to strict EU procurement rules.

Because civilian CSDP missions are largely paid through the EU budget, a starting point is the seven-year Multiannual Financial Framework, which sets the key parameters of the annual EU budgets. This state of affairs is inherently problematic as it is impossible to predict crises over such a long period. This was particularly obvious in the early years of civilian CSDP, when the number of missions increased rapidly (see Figure 1). In these early

⁸⁹ While these are essentially military terms in the EU context, it is a useful distinction as well for civilian crisis management. See EUMS, *EU Concept for Military Planning at the Political and Strategic level*, 10687/08 (16 June 2008), paragraphs 11-3; figure 1; L. Simón, ‘Command and control? Planning for EU military operations’, *Occasional Paper* 81, (Paris: EU-ISS, 2010), pp.11-2.

⁹⁰ Within advance planning itself, one can distinguish between generic planning (drawing up overall concepts) and contingency planning (preparing for a specific crisis). The EU is relatively weak in contingency planning for political reasons. This paper therefore focuses on generic planning.

⁹¹ EUMS, *EU Concept for Military Planning* (2008), paragraph 13.

stages, funds were always in short supply precisely because these missions had not been sufficiently budgeted for as part of the seven-year Multiannual Financial Framework. In 2005, for example, the budget of all the civilian missions was only €59 million, which could not cover the mission in Aceh.⁹² While the budget went up to €251 million in 2008, this proved insufficient for the new missions in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Georgia. In the budgetary period 2013-2020, however, the number of missions has stabilised (see Figure 1) and the total amount of annual funding available for civilian missions (€235-280 million) is generally sufficient, even though the budget is currently frozen.⁹³

Problems remain with crises that suddenly arise during the year. This was the case with the conflict in Ukraine in 2014. The launch of the SSR mission in Ukraine was, for example, “possible only because of the transfer of funds from other budget headings”.⁹⁴ It is useful nonetheless to briefly describe the mechanisms for increased flexibility. First of all, precisely for such cases, the EU has established a budget heading for “emergency measures”. This includes €37 million on an annual basis for unforeseen events. Second, it is also possible to use money from outside the CFSP budget, which occurred in the case of Ukraine.⁹⁵ If the amount of transferred money is less than 10% from either the sending or receiving budget line, the Commission itself can make such a decision on reallocation. If it is more than 10%, the Commission needs to negotiate with the budgetary authorities in the Council and the Parliament. Third, the EU builds-in margins within the budgets of civilian missions to ensure there will be savings that can be used to enable more flexibility.

Budgetary lines are also relatively unspecified (compared to the UN and OSCE). The EU budget includes separate budget lines for the large-scale civilian operations in Afghanistan, Kosovo and Georgia. All the other missions, however, are grouped under one budget line. This means that money can also be relatively easily transferred from mission to mission. That having been said, the budgets for the individual missions are also specified in the Council Decisions. However, Council Decisions cover the full period of the civilian mission, which can be more than one year, which creates some flexibility across years. Furthermore, Council Decisions are not negotiated by the Parliament, thereby reducing the number of actors with veto power.

4.1.2. Use of the CFSP budget

The CFSP budget can be used for operational activities taking place outside the European Union. It is thus different from the administrative budget of the EU institutions, EEAS and the various crisis management directorates. This distinction is important, because it means that the CFSP budget cannot, in principle, be used to strengthen mission support structures in Brussels, training in Brussels or even the travel of Brussels-based officials. The EU is thus currently in a situation where civilian missions typically have sufficient financial resources, but where the Brussels support structures are operating on a shoestring. The result is a decentralisation of functions, which often results in severe inefficiencies. For instance, many administrative functions (HRM, finance, ICT) are located within the missions and are thus, by definition, temporary. Staff members leave after their rotations, or when the mission ends, and experience is thereby lost.

⁹² EU-ISS, ‘CFSP Budget’, *Yearbook of European Security* (Paris: EU-ISS, 2013), p. 268.

⁹³ European Commission, *DRAFT General budget of the European Union* (2015), p. III/905.

⁹⁴ High Representative, *Contribution to the June 2015 European Council* (2015), p. 9.

⁹⁵ Interview #2, Brussels, February 2016.

The rules for the CFSP budget are, however, slowly but increasingly interpreted in a more flexible way. One key problem was that traditionally funding from the CFSP budget could not be used before the adoption of a Council Decision. This was rather problematic not only when missions had to be established quickly (e.g. in the case of the Aceh Monitoring Mission in 2005), but also for sending a fact-finding mission early in the planning process. Keeping EEAS staff on the ground for weeks or months, at great expense, was difficult given the constraints of the administrative budget.

Two important improvements have been made. First came the creation of the so-called ‘preparatory measures’, which were used for the first time in 2007.⁹⁶ These allow the EU to spend money from the CFSP budget, over a short period, to “establish the conditions for Union action ... and for the adoption of the necessary legal instruments”.⁹⁷ This includes, inter alia, “to assess the operational requirements, to provide for a rapid initial deployment of resources, or to establish the conditions on the ground for the launching of the operation”.⁹⁸ This is not so different, then, from the procedures in the UN and OSCE. Naturally, there has been some discussion what the phrases “short” and “conditions” mean in this provision. The interpretation of this provision has widened over time.⁹⁹ Preparatory measures can now also be used during the planning process to fund fact-finding by EEAS staff, for example.

More important than the preparatory measures were, secondly, the formal revisions to the Crisis Management Procedures in 2013. A key change has been to adopt two Council Decisions during the planning process rather than one. By having a Council Decision early in the planning process (at the same time as the initial Crisis Management Concept), it is possible not only to have a budget for a possible future mission, but also to appoint key staff early in anticipation of the mission. To a certain extent this replaces the rationale for preparatory measures. While this has been a recent and a useful development, it is worth pointing out that the EULEX Kosovo mission essentially followed this model already. In 2006, the EU established the Kosovo Planning Team through a Joint Action to be able to prepare for the deployment of EULEX to Kosovo in 2008.¹⁰⁰

4.1.3. Procurement procedures

Making the money available is one thing; spending it is quite another. Procurement is an area where traditionally a lot of problems occur, inter-institutional tensions arise, and deployment delays occur. Essentially, there are two challenges. First, while all CSDP missions are in principle allowed to adopt their own procurement rules,¹⁰¹ in practice they follow EU procurement rules laid down in Financial Regulation.¹⁰² These procurement rules are not perfectly tailor-made to each difficult situation in conflict countries. Second, the

⁹⁶ To appoint the Head of Mission-designate for EULEX Kosovo in 2007 to prepare for EUMM Georgia in 2008.

⁹⁷ Regulation (EU, Euratom) of the European Parliament and of the Council, *On the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union*, No 966/2012 (25 October 2012), article 54(c).

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Interview #2, Brussels, February 2016.

¹⁰⁰ Council Joint Action, *On the establishment of an EU Planning Team (EUPT Kosovo) regarding a possible EU crisis management operation in the field of rule of law and possible other areas in Kosovo*, 2006/304/CFSP (10 April 2006). Joint Actions were renamed Council Decisions with the Treaty of Lisbon.

¹⁰¹ Regulation (EU, Euratom), *On the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union* (2012): Article 60(2).

¹⁰² Written correspondence #9, June 2016.

EU procurement rules are complex. This requires specialised administrative expertise within the CSDP missions for the rules to be correctly adhered to. Given the staffing procedures, such expertise is not always available (at short notice). Administrative staff is typically contracted and the CPCC does not have sufficient manpower to cover these functions (see also Mission Support Platform 4.3.3). Because of both challenges, the European Commission's Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI), which administers the CFSP budget, is often in a tricky spot. It needs to navigate between the demands of the missions and the requirements of the budgetary authorities.¹⁰³

The EU has made significant improvements in terms of procurement following previous negative experiences, such as the Afghanistan mission. These include framework contracts, a warehouse and provisions on crisis situations. Framework contracts are important, since they are established prior to a CSDP mission. They allow the EU to select preferred suppliers for a certain period of time. This is about advance planning. These suppliers can subsequently deliver, during crisis response planning, and there is no longer a need for a separate procurement procedure. Missions currently have ready access to framework contracts on armoured and off-road vehicles, ICT, security and medical equipment, audit services as well as health and high risk insurance.¹⁰⁴ To further speed up procurement, missions can order supplies through the warehouse (see Section 4.3.2), which replenishes stocks through the framework contracts.

Another method to create flexibility is to apply the exceptions for 'crisis situations'.¹⁰⁵ While these provisions formally apply for "crisis management aid, civil protection operations or humanitarian aid operations",¹⁰⁶ they are now also used for civilian CSDP missions. The exception allows, for example, for the procurement to take place without a formal call for proposals and the use of negotiated procurement procedures with shorter deadlines (10-15 days) in extremely urgent cases. While the use of these exceptions is important, it needs to be said that more flexible procedures are not necessarily much easier to implement. A staff handbook from DG DEVCO, which has had more experience with these exceptions, notes that flexible procedures require an additional justification and documentation burden.¹⁰⁷ There are no magic bullets: "[a] crisis will generally make any type of procedure more difficult and more time consuming".¹⁰⁸

¹⁰³ S. Blockmans and Ch. Hillion (eds), *A legal commentary on Council Decision 2010/427/EU establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service* (Brussels: CEPS, February 2013).

¹⁰⁴ Written correspondence #9, June 2016.

¹⁰⁵ "Crisis situations in third countries shall be understood as situations of immediate or imminent danger threatening to escalate into armed conflict or to destabilise the country. Crisis situations shall also be understood as situations caused by natural disasters, manmade crisis such as wars and other conflicts or extraordinary circumstances having comparable effects related inter alia to climate change, environmental degradation, privation of access to energy and natural resources or extreme poverty." Commission Delegated Regulation 1268/2012: Article 190(2).

¹⁰⁶ Commission Delegated Regulation, *On the rules of application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012 of the European Parliament and of the Council on the financial rules applicable to the general budget of the Union*, 1268/2012 (31 December 2012): Article 190(1)(a).

¹⁰⁷ DG DEVCO, 'Using flexible procedures in situations of conflict and fragility', in *Operating in situations of conflict and fragility: EU staff handbook* (n.d.), online available: http://capacity4dev.ec.europa.eu/sites/default/files/file/09/04/2015_-_1046/staff_handbook-english-note_6.pdf (accessed 8 June 2016).

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., p. 82.

4.2. SELECTION, RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF STAFF

In addition to the financial capabilities, personnel is a critical capability for civilian missions. Once again, it is useful to distinguish between the generic mechanisms and procedures to identify and prepare staff for possible deployments, on the one hand, and the crisis response processes to recruit and train staff for actual missions on the other.

4.2.1. Headline goals and civilian capability plans

Having qualified personnel for civilian missions is about selecting the best people with the right expertise who happen to be available when a crisis breaks out (see further Section 4.2.3 below). The problem is naturally that such personnel might not be available quickly, if they have not been pre-selected and appropriately trained. As such, the EU and its member states have put significant effort, with respect to personnel, in terms of advance planning.

An important starting point are the European Council conclusions in Santa Maria da Feira from June 2000, which specify that the civilian crisis management priorities are police, rule of law, civilian administration and civil protection.¹⁰⁹ The same conclusions gave concrete targets for police, such as the ability to have up to 5,000 EU police officers deployed in international civilian missions (including in UN, OSCE and EU).¹¹⁰ Another target was to have 1,000 police officers available as a rapid deployment capability (within 30 days). The conclusions furthermore provided several concrete operational scenarios. This process was followed-up by the Civilian Headline Goals 2008 and 2010. It mirrored actions taken in military CSDP, where the member states attempted to agree on the level of ambition and drawing up capabilities catalogues.

The EU continued with the multi-annual Civilian Capability Development Plan in 2012. Based on the experience with civilian missions, this exercise has been much more practical than some of the initial setting of overall goals. This is partially the result of an understanding that the member states not only remain firmly in charge of civilian resources, but also vary dramatically in terms of what and how they can deliver. An example of the more incremental and facilitatory approach is the establishment of the list of generic civilian tasks in 2015.¹¹¹ These tasks were grouped under command and control, engage and implement, inform, set up and sustain, and duty of care. Developing generic civilian tasks has become a very practical exercise, with actions such as figuring out how to conduct recruitment interviews via Skype on EU computer platforms.

4.2.2. Pre-identification of personnel, training, roster

In addition to setting levels of ambition and making sure that all the concepts and procedures are in place prior to a crisis, it is important that potential personnel have been pre-identified, trained and can somehow be contacted when required. Much of this process is in the hands of the member states. After all, they have the responsibility for their own police officers, prosecutors and judges. They should also make sure that their personnel have the appropriate competences, are medically fit, and can be deployed abroad. Member states vary significantly in terms of how they carry out these tasks; and many have been uncooperative as regards EU initiatives to identify and train personnel prior to the outbreak of a crisis.

¹⁰⁹ European Council, *Conclusions of the Presidency* (19-20 June 2000), Annex 1, Appendix 3(b).

¹¹⁰ European Council, *Conclusions* (2000), Annex 1, Appendix 4.

¹¹¹ Interview #6, Brussels, April 2016.

It is worth pointing out some of the shining examples among the member states.¹¹² Particularly the Nordic member states take the pre-identification of personnel and training seriously. Before they can be added to one of the national rosters, candidates must enrol in a core generic training programme equivalent to at least two-to-four full-time weeks. Belgium and Germany have similar training programmes as well. These training modules instil knowledge about international organisations and missions, but also very practical skills such as learning to drive 4x4 vehicles and Hostile Environment Awareness Training (HEAT). Some of those skills are also taught during pre-deployment and in-mission training (see below), but naturally it is better if staff already have these skills prior to recruitment. It facilitates rapid deployment. One key issue is the link between core generic training and actual deployment: training is expensive and many trained staff members ultimately do not go on actual missions.

In addition to these national processes, the EU has put considerable energy into creating a European roster. This effort has been largely futile for a variety of reasons. First, the EU is spending a lot of time and money to set up an online system – named Goalkeeper – to keep track of potential personnel. It does not, however, have the resources to keep the rosters up-to-date. Since personnel listed in the databases is often not available for missions, the CPCC prefers to rely on the standard calls for contributions instead of the roster.¹¹³ Second, and relatedly, the member states have been very protective of their own personnel, afraid that they may actually have to deliver (and pay for these resources). So they have made little effort to fill the relevant EU rosters and keep the information up-to-date.¹¹⁴ Third, as a result of EU data protection rules and obstructive member states, the EU does not have a roster of former mission staff, or their evaluation reports. All staff members interviewed for this study have dismissed EU-level rosters as a waste of energy. Instead, they seem to prefer to rely on informal contacts and institutional memory when rapidly recruiting qualified staff.

4.2.3. *Call for contributors and recruitment of staff*

Most of the personnel required for civilian missions are recruited and selected on an individual basis. This is a major administrative process. In 2014, for example, there were 1,269 vacancies across the EU missions, for which 7,899 candidates applied. Some 2,122 interviews were organised and 807 candidates were eventually selected. To understand better the significance of this challenge, it is important to describe the recruitment and selection process in greater depth.

Every year, each mission is allowed to organise three ordinary calls for contributions, which adds up to about 30 calls per year across all missions.¹¹⁵ While the EU tries to minimise extraordinary calls, because of the extra workload entailed, it organises an additional 10 calls per year. These calls for contributions are sent to the member states. They include seconded-only positions as well as positions for seconded and contracted staff. In the latter category, priority goes to seconded staff when they have equal qualifications to their contracted counterparts. For functions in administration (e.g.

¹¹² D. Korski and R. Gowan, *Can the EU Rebuild Failing States? A Review of Europe's Civilian Capacities* (London: ECFR, 2009), annex II have done an extensive naming-and-shaming exercise which does not need to be repeated here. Some member states have made improvements since the publication of this report, but the overall ranking still stands.

¹¹³ Interview #7, Brussels, April 2016.

¹¹⁴ Interview #1, Brussels, February 2016.

¹¹⁵ Interview #7, Brussels, April 2016.

finance, procurement, statistics, and human resources) and for some specialised functions (e.g. aviation) it is difficult to recruit seconded officials, so staff is typically recruited on the international market. In terms of the candidates, the bulk of applications are sent for the open contracted positions. Particularly contracted positions for security officers can each attract 100+ candidates. The deadline for most calls is three weeks.¹¹⁶

For key managerial positions – such as deputy Head of Mission, Chief of Staff, Head of Operations, and Head of Administration – the selection panel is chaired by the CPCC and the Civilian Operations Commander makes the decision. Most recruitments are, however, carried out by the missions themselves with the Head of Mission having appointment power. The CPCC sends the mission the dossiers of the candidates. The mission prepares a shortlist of ideally three candidates. Almost all interviews, except for the deputy Head of Mission, are done via telephone.¹¹⁷ Candidates are examined on the basis of an evaluation grid, which includes knowledge about the EU, the mission, and the local conflict as well as motivation, presentation, language skills in addition to their general competence in the area of the position.

While only two out of three vacancies were filled in 2014, there are large discrepancies between missions and across profiles. Recently launched missions tend to be very popular, as they are high on the international agenda. For the first call of the SSR mission in Ukraine, for example, no less than 1,500 candidates applied. Recruiting staff typically gets more difficult once the mission is running for a couple of years. Furthermore, missions have different profiles. The monitoring mission in Georgia is about having a presence on the ground, while capacity-building missions may be about providing specialised expertise. For example, it has proved difficult to recruit qualified judges for Kosovo: it is difficult for the member states to release judges, who tend to be tied up in long course cases. Also, their time to deployment is too long.

4.2.4. Pre-deployment and in-mission training of staff

Following the recruitment of mission staff, there is normally a period of about four to six weeks, during which staff members are prepared for deployment. This includes pre-deployment training lasting four to five days. The member states themselves have the primary responsibility for organising pre-deployment training for their seconded staff.¹¹⁸ As is the case with core training, the quality of pre-deployment training varies across the member states.¹¹⁹ This is partially a matter of the interest and resources of a member state in training, but it also has to do with practical reasons. While large member states can easily run a regular course preparing staff for a deployment to Kosovo, a smaller member state may not be in a position to provide a tailor-made pre-deployment course on the much smaller EUCAP Sahel in Niger. For internationally contracted staff, the situation is worse as there are no clear guidelines with respect to pre-deployment training.

In response to the problems with pre-deployment training, several (pan-)European initiatives have been developed. National course providers may, for example, open up their courses to staff from other member states. More ambitious, however, were the two

¹¹⁶ Under the Crisis Response Team (CRT) concept, the deadline is one week. While the formal roster for this concept is no longer used, the procedures may be applied in case of the need for rapid deployment.

¹¹⁷ There is a separate recruitment procedure for the Head of Mission.

¹¹⁸ CIVCOM, *Enhancing civilian crisis management pre-deployment training*, 17506/09 (11 December 2009), paragraph 9.

¹¹⁹ CIVCOM, *Civilian crisis management pre-deployment training - report on survey results and elements for way ahead*, 10976/11 (13 June 2011), paragraphs 7-18.

ENTRi projects which ran until 2016.¹²⁰ Both were financed through the EU's Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace and ran for a period of three years. The projects involved a couple of million euros and they were run by pan-European consortiums led by the Center for International Peace Operations (ZIF) in Berlin. These projects provided training for mission staff sent out on all sorts of missions, including UN, OSCE and African Union, but the emphasis is on civilian CSDP. ENTRi focused mostly on unarmed civilians, but with the emphasis on the comprehensive approach, ENTRi also welcomed police to foster a team-spirit already during training.

One of the advantages of ENTRi was that it fully funded its participants (including travel and accommodation).¹²¹ The philosophy driving this was that all civilian staff, regardless of their seconding member state, should have training. This was also very attractive for contracted staff, who would otherwise have had to pay for their own training. Unsurprisingly, many of the courses were oversubscribed. Some observers were also sceptical about whether this leads to 'tourism', i.e. participants being trained, but never actually deployed. ENTRi, however, put a selection system in place which significantly reduced this practice. As a result of the project-based set up, these initiatives were rather flexible and helped the member states out with pre-deployment training. Yet on the other hand, projects are by definition temporary, and therefore ENTRi was hardly a sustainable solution for the future.

It is, in this respect, relevant that the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) has also started to offer pre-deployment training in 2015.¹²² The ambition is to have a four-day pre-deployment training about 10 times per year, during which participants also meet up with the relevant desk officers who are dealing with their mission in the CPCC. The challenge for this system is mostly financial. Member states have to cover travel and accommodation. When a participant is already 'on mission' (i.e. flying directly from Brussels to the mission), these costs can occasionally also be covered by the missions. The ESDC borrows conference locations from the Commission and the Permanent Representations. The trainers are drawn from the EU institutions and thus provide their services for free. While the ESDC potentially offers a more institutionalised solution for pre-deployment training, these financial considerations are significant.

Pre-deployment training often remains generic. There is thus a need for additional mission induction training. Currently, in-mission training varies significantly across missions. It is mostly organised by mission staff, as it is useful that new staff is directly trained by the mission experts. In some missions, such as Georgia, there is specific training available for driving with armoured vehicles, while this is not necessary in other missions. In Ukraine, it became obvious that very few experts had sufficient SSR expertise. A dedicated training was therefore organised. The EU is currently harmonising the induction training across all civilian missions. The aim is to provide two to three days of in-mission training with standardised presentations.

In addition to pre-deployment and in-mission training, a wide range of more specialised courses and e-learning courses are available for staff members already deployed as well as those considering future deployment. The different training institutes provide complementary courses in this regard. ESDC courses have a civil-military character with a range of participants. It also offers courses for more senior participants. The European

¹²⁰ ENTRi I and II included pre-deployment training. Starting in June 2016, ENTRi III focuses on training the CSDP mission trainers and providing training packages for CSDP missions.

¹²¹ Interview #4, via phone, April 2016.

¹²² Interview #5, Brussels, April 2016.

Union Police Services Training (EUPST) is mostly focused on police. The European Police College (CEPOL) also focuses on the higher-level police officers with several relevant courses on the external dimension of the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. ENTRi, as noted, has an emphasis on training unarmed civilian staff. In addition, the individual member states offer specialised courses open to international participants on their areas of specialisation.

4.3. EQUIPMENT AND MISSION SUPPORT

In addition to finance and personnel, civilian CSDP missions require equipment and mission support. In the area of military missions, this is often where key capability shortfalls are identified (from jets, ships, tanks, and bullets to air-to-air refuelling, transport, and medical facilities). The civilian 'kit' may be less impressive, but civilian missions still have significant requirements. Recently, the EU has made significant steps forward with the warehouse which makes sure that equipment is available prior to the deployment of missions. It has also focused on setting up a mission support platform in Brussels as a key enabler for administrative functions.

4.3.1. Infrastructure, local headquarters and accommodation

One of the key challenges during the establishment of missions is to find an appropriate location for the headquarters and, depending on the security situation in the country, accommodation for staff. The physical infrastructure must naturally be vetted for security, which is done by officials from the CPCC. Building contracts can be acquired, after prospecting the local market, through a negotiated procurement procedure.¹²³ There is thus no need to put out a call for tender. Sometimes, appropriate buildings are not available. In Agadez in Niger, for example, the CSDP mission had to construct its own building.¹²⁴ Apart from the mission's own infrastructure, the missions need to establish procedures for medical evacuation to the closest hospital.

4.3.2. Warehouse: vehicles, ICT systems and medical/security equipment

In addition to the physical infrastructure on the ground, the EU established a warehouse in 2012. The warehouse is run by a private partner in Germany, contracted through a call for tender, which delivers equipment to new missions during their deployment phase as well as to existing missions in urgent cases. It does not supply existing missions on a continuous basis and it does not take equipment back when missions are terminated. The warehouse concept is currently under review and it is likely that the function of the warehouse will be expanded in the future to also serve ongoing missions.

The warehouse has a long history. With a view to rapid deployment, as specified in the 2008 and 2010 civilian headline goals, it was decided that the EU needed to have a facility capable of quickly supplying new missions during deployment. The first warehouse opened in January 2010 on the premise of the EU Police Mission in Bosnia.¹²⁵ This was clearly a temporary solution as EUPM would close in 2012, but it was a convenient solution to

¹²³ Commission Delegated Regulation, *On the rules of application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) No 966/2012* (2012), Article 134(1)(h).

¹²⁴ Interview #3, March 2016, Brussels.

¹²⁵ Council Decision, *On the establishment of a warehouse for civilian crisis management missions*, 2012/698/CFSP (13 November 2012), operational paragraph 4.

circumvent EU rules.¹²⁶ In the Presidency Conclusions on ESDP from November 2009, it was however suggested that a more permanent solution should be developed. This suggestion was eventually accepted in the Council Decision 2012/698/CFSP in November 2012. The warehouse is interestingly financed through the Instrument for Stability, administered by EuropeAid, rather than the CFSP budget.¹²⁷

The warehouse essentially keeps a redundant stock. Using the framework contracts, it buys a wide array of equipment. It can deliver such equipment to new missions at short notice. Subsequently, it again replenishes its own stock.¹²⁸ When equipment is not covered under the framework contracts, the warehouse uses the regular procurement procedures. As a result of the warehouse's establishment, new missions do not have to go through the procurement process themselves and they do not have to wait for the supplier to deliver the goods in theatre. At present, the warehouse provides the mission with ICT equipment, off-road and armoured vehicles, security equipment (helmets and jackets) and medical equipment. Its supplies also include EU flags and other sorts of visibility equipment.¹²⁹ The warehouse is naturally useful for new missions in terms of rapid deployment.

4.3.3. Mission support platform

As noted above, due to the financing of civilian CSDP, many administrative functions have been decentralised by delegating them to the missions. This includes support functions such as HRM, finance, logistics, IT and communications. While some of these functions will have to be located within the missions on the ground (e.g. press and communications), other functions could be better organised centrally. Decentralisation has two related problems. First, because missions are temporary in nature, qualified staff members need to be recruited during the deployment phase and are removed from their posts when the mission ends. Second, because civilian missions are deployed typically in difficult environment, administrative staff may not be interested in long-term deployments. The net result is that it is difficult to recruit well-trained administrative staff and to retain their expertise.

In the case of the UN, this problem is addressed through the Department of Field Support in New York and the Global and Regional Service Centres. The EU has looked into this possibility for a number of years. Establishing a Shared Services Centre was already raised in a lessons learned report in April 2010.¹³⁰ A 2011 the European Parliament motion noted that “by addressing the personnel, logistics, procurement and financial responsibilities of the civilian CSDP missions and by relieving the Heads of Mission from part of their administrative duties”, the Shared Services Centre “would guarantee greater efficiency both by pooling administrative functions, starting with the selection and recruitment of

¹²⁶ UK House of Commons European Scrutiny Committee, *Ninth report of session 2010-11* (24 November 2010), p. 112.

¹²⁷ EU, *Warehouse services to enable rapid deployment of a medium-sized CSDP mission – common foreign and security policy (CFSP) and Instrument for Stability*, 2013/S 045-071204 (18 February 2013), online available: <http://ted.europa.eu/udl?uri=TED:NOTICE:71204-2013:TEXT:EN:HTML> (accessed 24 May 2016).

¹²⁸ Written correspondence #9, June 2016.

¹²⁹ Ibid.; Draft Council Decision, *On the establishment of a warehouse for civilian crisis management missions*, 13742/12 (20 September 2012), pp. 7-8.

¹³⁰ Council, *Annual Report on the identification and implementation of lessons and best practices in civilian CSDP missions in 2010*, 17386/10 (19 April 2010).

personnel, and by centralising procurement and equipment management”.¹³¹ The Council formally encouraged the EU institutions to make work of this Shared Services Centre, along with the warehouse, in its July 2012 conclusions.¹³²

The negotiations over the Shared Services Centre have been difficult. The main premise, that the different missions would individually contribute in order to have this new centre in Brussels, has resulted in a debate over whether the CFSP budget can be used for these expenditures. Over time, the ambitions have been watered down: by the time that the Council agreed to establish the Mission Support Platform, a less ambitious name, in April 2016, only a total of six to eight staff members were still foreseen from the original 30.¹³³ This does not even equate to one additional staff member per mission. These six to eight new staff members come on top of the approximately ten mission ‘support elements’, which are seconded mission staff to Brussels. As such the new Mission Support Platform, which is likely to become operational in 2016, is much less significant than originally planned.

¹³¹ European Parliament, *MOTION FOR A EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT RESOLUTION on the development of the common security and defence policy following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty* (29 April 2011), paragraph 21(c).

¹³² Council, *Conclusions on common security and defence policy 3183rd FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting Brussels* (23 July 2012), Article 6.

¹³³ Interviews #6 and #8, Brussels, April 2016.

5. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Capabilities are central to the success or failure of civilian missions in the EU, the UN and the OSCE. They are deployed to achieve the objectives of missions. As such they are as important for situation assessment, planning procedures and indeed the objectives of the mission themselves. This report has analysed the question *“How, and through which mechanisms, do the EU, UN and OSCE make resources available for civilian missions?”* The focus has therefore been on the procedures in Brussels, New York and Vienna, and less on the availability of civilian resources across the member states.¹³⁴ The report has paid a great deal of attention to the EU, but has done so from a distinct comparative perspective. In terms of capabilities, the emphasis has been on financial resources, personnel, equipment and mission support.

It is often said that there are trade-offs between quality, speed and costs. In the area of civilian crisis management, however, all are often required at the same time. Missions of the EU, the UN and the OSCE regularly have to be deployed rapidly, within budget, and they are supposed to deliver high quality results. Indeed, it is precisely when rapid deployment is needed that civilian missions can struggle. If missions had an unlimited timeframe in which to procure equipment or to recruit personnel, the challenges would be smaller. Yet when it comes to crisis response, civilian missions normally do not have the luxury of time. As this report has shown, all three organisations have developed their own processes and procedures to deliver rapid response and to reduce deployment times.

The purpose of this report has been to form a capabilities-based assessment.¹³⁵ The first section of the report set out the levels of ambition of the EU, the UN and the OSCE in terms of their civilian missions around the world. The second section discussed the procedures for planning and the deployment of capabilities in all three organisations. The third section zoomed in on the EU to obtain a more in-depth insight into the capabilities shortfalls. The systematic analysis of the financial resources, personnel policies and the equipment and mission support has provided us with a number of areas for improvement. These findings are based on actual EU experience. The activities of the UN and OSCE have furthermore been used as benchmarks.

This conclusion focuses on some of the weaknesses and shortfalls identified. The method is the following. For each of these weaknesses, the conclusion first analyses why some processes in the EU are less than perfect. Second, it discusses how the UN and the OSCE address similar challenges and whether they have best practices on offer. Finally, the conclusion suggests policy recommendations and provides policy advice based on its comparative analysis. The UN and OSCE have a longer experience with civilian crisis management and it is important to see where the EU can improve.

It has been mentioned several times that the EU has made notable efforts in improving its civilian capabilities to react to crises and to engage in crisis management. This should be stressed. While the EU encountered significant problems during the first civilian CSDP missions as well as significant challenges during the more ambitious missions launched in 2007-08, it is now in a much better position to conduct civilian crisis missions. The mechanisms and procedures through which the EU acts have clearly improved. That having been said, the EU has, however, focused mostly on the low-hanging fruit. For the EU to engage more effectively in civilian CSDP, it needs to target some of the more complicated challenges (see further below).

¹³⁴ The capabilities of selected member states are addressed in EU-CIVCAP, *Report on capability-based analysis of technologies, personnel and procedures*, DL2.1 (forthcoming).

¹³⁵ EU-CIVCAP, *EU Capabilities for Conflict Prevention and Peacebuilding* (2016).

One of the great paradoxes of EU civilian crisis management is that it is politically, but not administratively, centralised. Civilian CSDP is directed from Brussels, but not sufficiently supported. Overall, the high degree of centralisation, institutionalisation and legalisation in the EU creates a lack of flexibility. EU actors often cite the lack of ‘political will’ on the part of the member states. This may well be the case, but if the UN and the OSCE are able to pull something off, this clearly can hardly be an excuse. The remainder of this conclusion evaluates the three key areas relating to civilian capabilities – financial resources, personnel, and equipment and mission support – before drawing policy recommendations.

5.1. FINANCING OF MISSIONS AND PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES

In terms of financial resources, it is mostly good news. The main problems have changed over time from insufficient budget and insufficiently flexible procurement to insufficient administrative staff. This problem is solvable. It is worth recalling that in the early years of CSDP, the EU did not have enough budget for civilian missions. When the Aceh Monitoring Mission was negotiated during the summer of 2005, the EU had already run out of its CFSP budget for the year. The shortfall had to be made up through voluntary contributions by non-EU member states!¹³⁶ Similarly, negotiations over EULEX Kosovo in 2008 always had to consider timing, because it affected the budget. While the Ukraine mission in 2014 caused some budgetary problems, the overall impression is that the CFSP budget currently has sufficient resources. The annual €37 million for ‘emergency measures’ are very useful as a method to create more flexibility.

It was not just the overall budget levels which caused complications, but also the specific EU procurement rules. Following the resignation of the Santer Commission in 1999, the EU has understandably adopted stricter rules when it comes to spending money. It took some time before the budgetary authorities and the administrators in the European Commission appreciated that the local situation in Afghanistan demanded a different interpretation of the EU rules than, say, the situation in Austria. While the procurement rules remain strict, a degree of flexibility has been introduced. Examples of flexibility include the preparatory measures, an early Council Decision in the planning process and the possibility to refer to crisis situations.

The key outstanding challenge remains for the civilian missions to recruit personnel who have the expertise to deal with the EU’s procurement rules. When it comes to rapid response, this can be a real challenge. During the mission start-up phase, many processes need to take place simultaneously. Staff must be recruited; equipment needs to be purchased; etc. Yet tenders can be launched only after the mission has recruited its administrative personnel (see further below). This is particularly problematic as the CPCC does not have the administrative capacity itself to provide sufficient support. The Mission Support Platform should be helpful (see further below), but it does not meet the EU’s ambitions. A significant reallocation of the budget from the missions to the EEAS support structures would be appropriate. Ultimately, the member states have to pay for both the administrative and operational budget. A reallocation therefore makes sense.

Policy Recommendation 1: The EU needs to reallocate funding from the operational CFSP budget to the administrative budget of the EEAS to strengthen the enabling mission support services in Brussels.

¹³⁶ Dijkstra, *Policy-Making in EU Security and Defense* (2013), p. 133.

When analysing the UN and the OSCE, it is apparent that financial questions are often complicated. In the UN context, there are equally discussions over whether peacekeeping operations should become part of the regular UN budget. While the extraordinarily large support account for peacekeeping operations is problematic in various ways, it does allow for a fairly flexible mechanism to pay for support staff in New York. Political missions, on the other hand, are part of the regular budget, which means that recruiting additional administrative support staff is very difficult. Similarly, in the OSCE, there are clear trade-offs with respect to the unified budget, the need for flexibility, and the budgetary cycle. In the OSCE, budgetary control is exceptionally high in that every single position is defined within the budget and needs to be justified. Based on this comparative perspective, it is not obvious how the EU can further improve the financing of its civilian missions.

5.2. SELECTION, RECRUITMENT AND TRAINING OF STAFF

In terms of selection, recruitment and training of mission staff, the EU has made some significant improvements. In terms of human resources administration, the mechanisms and procedures for selection and recruitment have been professionalised. Worthy initiatives have also been established to close gaps in pre-deployment training. However, two fundamental problems remain. As the member states have prime responsibility for civilian capabilities, it is not surprising that there remain significant variation across the member states. Second, the EU and its member states fail to fulfil their obligations towards internationally contracted staff. This is particularly problematic, as international contracted staff normally provide the administrative functions in the missions.

While this report has not specifically addressed the individual member states, it could be said that the quality of staff and their preparation varies significantly. Despite various questionnaires and other harmonising initiatives, many member states remain slow on the uptake. Failures on the side of the member states include not keeping advanced and up-to-date rosters of available staff, not providing their staff with adequate training, and simply not making qualified staff available for the civilian missions. Shortages remain significant. While the situation is not necessarily better at the UN or the OSCE, the high quality of personnel is arguably something the EU typically takes pride in. This report is not the place to provide recommendations for individual countries, but in many of the member states, there should be more serious discussions between the ministries of foreign affairs and interior and justice on how to improve personnel policy.

Policy Recommendation 2: member states need to do more to ensure that well-trained staff can be selected and recruited for civilian missions at a short notice. This requires more intensive coordination between the relevant ministries within each member state.

The report has discussed the various pre-deployment training initiatives as well as the specialised courses available for civilian experts. The reality is that the member states are not often able to provide adequate pre-deployment training. For instance, Luxembourg cannot organise every three months a week-long seminar for staff from Luxembourg who will be deployed to EUTM Somalia. It does not have the expertise and it does not send enough experts. While the member states have primary responsibility to train their staff, it is therefore clear that European-level training programmes are a necessity. The ENTRi projects and the courses of the ESDC therefore fill an important vacuum. However, the former are temporary projects, which have now been terminated, and the latter has not enough financing to systematically pull it off. The EU therefore needs to make training much more sustainable.

Training is a particular problem for internationally contracted staff. Because they are contracted by the missions, there are no member states which take responsibility for training. The net result is that very few contracted staff take pre-deployment training. This is simply shocking. By contrast, in the UN and the OSCE, all contracted staff are offered pre-deployment training in the training centres in, respectively, Brindisi and Vienna. The problems are, however, not only with the pre-deployment training. Administrative staff could significantly benefit from EU training on, for example, EU administrative procedures. Specialised courses on procurement, logistics, ICT, etc. would be most welcome. While the EU as the formal employer has the prime responsibility, the member states cannot ignore contracted staff either. After all, contracted staff are also nationals with passports and it is important that all member states recognise this.

Policy Recommendation 3: The EU needs to make pre-deployment training sustainable, so that every mission member can benefit from training. This includes increasing the training budget of the ESDC as well as making budget again available for flexible projects.

Policy Recommendation 4: The EU needs to provide pre-deployment training as well as relevant specialised training to contracted staff. All missions should have a specific budget allocated to pay for such training.

An interesting development in the UN and the OSCE is the development of (virtual) standing capacities for civilian missions. The UN has a standing police capacity, which has been most helpful in terms of rapidly establishing and supporting missions. The OSCE has a Rapid Deployment Roster, which not only includes people from the Vienna headquarters, but also staff deployed already in various missions. While the UN, given the sheer size of its civilian missions, can easily afford to have such a capacity, in the case of the OSCE it is virtual, as the staff is normally employed in other roles. In any case, in both organisations, these capacities are relatively modest, but nonetheless helpful. It would also be a good idea for the EU to develop such capacities.

Part of a possible virtual standing capacity is an understanding that people work for the EU rather than for a specific mission or body within the EEAS. When the EU wants to rapidly launch a new mission, it should be able to draw on the people in the CMPD, CPCC as well as staff in the existing missions. This already happens sometimes informally (that mission staff temporarily serve in other missions), but it would be more effective to do this more structurally. In addition to some key function profiles (e.g. police; rule of law), a virtual standing capacity for civilian EU missions should include administrative staff (procurement, logistics, security, ICT, etc.). Furthermore, a virtual capacity should also include qualified former mission members. A database containing a list of former mission staff does not exist, which is incomprehensible.

Policy Recommendation 5: The EU needs to work towards virtual standing capacities that can be used to rapidly launch missions and provide specialised support.

5.3. EQUIPMENT AND MISSION SUPPORT

The EU has made major advances in terms of equipment and mission support. Procurement procedures have become more flexible and the negotiation of framework contracts has been useful. In addition, the warehouse structure, which keeps a stock and acts as an intermediary between supplier and mission, is a necessary step towards professionalisation. It is also clear that these developments bring the EU closer to the practices employed by the UN and the OSCE, even though it has not entirely caught up

yet. The ongoing negotiations concerning a Warehouse 2.0 concept, which will also service the existing missions, are important in this respect. The EU will also have to continue to establish new framework contracts for equipment.

The key shortfall, however, has been mission support. The recent agreement to establish a Mission Support Platform is helpful in this respect. This Mission Support Platform, paid for by the missions collectively, will lead to the centralisation of support functions in Brussels. This also allows the EU to retain key expertise once a mission winds down. The drawback is, of course, that the proposed Mission Support Platform does not live up to the ambitions of the EU. It is simply too small when compared to, especially, the New York-based UN Department of Field Support and the UN Global and Regional Service Centres. Ideally, the Mission Support Platform should clear the field missions from most administrative procedures, but also provide capacity when launching new missions. This clearly requires more than, say, one logistical expert in Brussels.

Policy Recommendation 6: The new Mission Support Platform needs to be established as quickly as possible. And it should be significantly strengthened.

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METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

This appendix gives additional information about the sources of the data used for the figures in the report and the methodology used to compile the data. For the sake of simplicity, the term ‘mission’ is used for all field operations of the EU, the UN and the OSCE, although several of them have different names, e.g. offices, presence and force.

Figure 1 (number of missions and number of personnel in missions)

Number of missions

The following operations were included in the figure:

- civilian and civilian-military CSDP missions of the EU;
- peacekeeping as well as political and peacebuilding missions of the UN;
- missions (field operations) of the OSCE.

The data covers the period between 2003 and 2015. The missions that focused only on ‘good offices’ and electoral missions were excluded, as they do not fall directly under the scope of this report. The following activities were excluded for this reason:

- For the EU:
 - EU Special Representatives (EUSRs);
- For the UN:
 - Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East (UNSCO);
 - Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon (UNSCOL);
 - United Nations Electoral Observation Mission in Burundi (MENUB);
 - United Nations Regional Centre for Preventive Diplomacy for Central Asia (UNRCCA);
- For OSCE:
 - Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office on the Conflict Dealt with by the OSCE Minsk Conference;
 - The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Baku was excluded because of lack of available data.

Number of personnel

For the UN peacekeeping missions, the numbers of police and international civilian staff were added to calculate the total number of civilian personnel for each mission. The numbers were taken from the monthly peacekeeping fact sheets on the UN website;¹³⁷ the average from twelve months was then calculated for each calendar year. The exception is the year 2003, for which the used data was from December.

For the UN political and peacebuilding missions, the data were taken from publications ‘Year in review’¹³⁸ and from UN Political and Peacebuilding Missions Fact Sheets from the UN website. Data was from December, with the exception of 2014 (August)¹³⁹ and 2015 (November).¹⁴⁰

¹³⁷ http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/factsheet_archive.shtml

¹³⁸ <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/publications.shtml>

¹³⁹ http://www.un.org/wcm/webdav/site/undpa/shared/undpa/pdf/ppbm_Aug2014.pdf

¹⁴⁰ http://www.un.org/undpa/sites/www.un.org.undpa/files/ppbm_November_2015.pdf

For the EU, the data was taken from SIPRI Yearbooks on Armaments, Disarmament and International Security.

For OSCE the data comes from the annual reports on OSCE activities;¹⁴¹ it does not include 2015 due to lack of availability of data.

Figure 3. Components of the mandates of the EU, UN and OSCE missions in 2015

The figure covers the mandated activities of the missions in 2015. For EU and UN, the main sources of data were the legal bases of the missions, respectively Council Joint Actions and Decisions,¹⁴² and UN Security Council Resolutions.¹⁴³ These sources were then supplemented with the information from the official websites of the missions. The exception was United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK), where the legal basis - UNSC Resolution 1244 - is still officially in force. Yet due to the declaration of independence of Kosovo, the mission was unable to perform its mandated assigned tasks. Therefore UNMIK had been reconfigured on the basis of the reports of the UN Secretary-General from 2008 and 2009,¹⁴⁴ and these reports were therefore taken as the basis to establish what were the actual tasks performed by the mission.

For the OSCE field operations the legal bases are mostly broad and general; the main sources of information were therefore the official websites,¹⁴⁵ accessed in March 2016.

The activities of the missions were divided into ten categories which were established by the authors. The evidence for each category was established directly in the sources of information mentioned above. The exception was the category 'riot control', not covered directly by the sources. For this category the criterion was the presence of formed units of police.

¹⁴¹ <http://www.osce.org/node/66000>

¹⁴² <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/>

¹⁴³ <http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/>

¹⁴⁴ <http://www.unmikonline.org/Pages/UNMIK%20Key%20documents.aspx>

¹⁴⁵ <http://www.osce.org/where>